

**Independent Committee in relation to the  
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

**Witness Statement of WONG King-man**

I, WONG King-man, of New Territories North Command, Fire Services Department, 28 Yuen Wo Road, Shatin, N.T., do say as follows:-

1. I was the then Deputy Chief Fire Officer (New Territories North) (“**DCFO(NTN)**”) of the Fire Services Department (“**FSD**”) of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. I have joined the FSD for about 29 years since 1996 and was promoted to the rank of Deputy Chief Fire Officer on 13 October 2023. My primary role was to act as a deputy to Assistant Director (New Territories North) (“**AD(NTN)**”) in leading the New Territories North Command. I am currently on pre-retirement leave, from 26 January 2026 to 25 July 2026.
  
2. I make this Witness Statement pursuant to Request 4 of the Independent Committee (“**Committee**”) in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po as set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo, Solicitors for the Committee, to the FSD dated 4 February 2026 (“**4 February Letter**”) in which specific questions were raised in paragraphs 1 to 10 and 16 (“**Questions**”). Save where otherwise appears, the facts deposed hereto are within my personal knowledge or are derived from office files and records and sources to which I have access and are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Save as otherwise specified, this Witness Statement adopts the same abbreviations and nomenclature as in the 4 February Letter.

3. This Witness Statement addresses Questions 7(b), 8, 9(a), 9(d) and 10(b) of the 4 February Letter. Other Questions which are within the FSD's purview will be addressed in the witness statements of other relevant officers of the FSD to the Committee. I understand that the FSD has indexed all relevant documents in its possession in Lists of Documents produced on various dates (collectively "LoD"). In this Witness Statement, I shall refer to these documents by their designation in the LoD (for example, [FSD/A(I)/1] means Item 1 in Part A(I) of the LoD, [FSD(2)/A(I)/1] means Item 1 in Part A(I) of the 2<sup>nd</sup> LoD, and so on) without annexing them hereto for the avoidance of duplication.
4. This Witness Statement is divided into the following parts:-
- (1) **Part A** describes the material events and decisions made by me as Incident Commander after the fire was upgraded to No. 4 Alarm in answer to **Questions 7(b), 8, 9(a) and 9(d)**; and
  - (2) **Part B** describes the specific rescue strategies devised and/or implemented by me as the Rescue Officer in answer to **Question 10(b)**.
- The response should be read together with the timeline and account of the No. 4 Alarm Fire and beyond provided in paragraphs 30 to 51 of the Witness Statement of AD(NTN), TANG Wing-wah dated 16 January 2026.

**Part A: Material events and decisions at the scene of the fire**

**Questions 7(b), 8, 9(a) and 9(d) of Request 4**

[Questions 8 and 9(a)]

5. As stated in paragraphs 33 and 37 of the Witness Statement of

TANG Wing-wah, I was the first of the two Incident Commanders of the No. 4 Alarm Fire (from 1534 hours to 1821 hours) and later took over the role of Rescue Officer from 1623 hours on 26 November 2026 to 0935 hours on 27 November 2026. At 1511 hours on 26 November 2025, I received a phone call from the Fire Services Communications Centre (“**FSCC**”) reporting a No. 3 Alarm Fire incident at Wang Cheong House, Wang Fuk Court. According to the FSCC, Divisional Officer (“**DO**”) LAM Ho-chun was en route to the scene. While the No. 3 Alarm Fire incident is typically managed by a Senior Divisional Officer (“**SDO**”) or DO according to the scheduled attendance, I customarily proceeded to the scene to assess the situation, offer advice or assistance, and take charge if the fire escalates.

6. En route, I encountered a traffic jam and observed that multiple buildings were ablaze at Wang Fuk Court, along with dense smoke rising. Upon arrival at 1535 hours, I commenced a 360-degree assessment of the entire Wang Fuk Court.
7. At 1538 hours, I directed the FSCC to collaborate with the Public Safety and Communication Division to issue a Special Announcement via press release and the FSD Social Media to alert the public about the fire.
8. At about 1539 hours, I observed six buildings ablaze, which were later identified as follows: Wang Shing House – alight (south-west side façade), Wang Cheong House – well alight (multiple façades), Wang Tai House – well alight (multiple façades), Wang Kin House – alight (south-west side façade), Wang Sun House – alight (south side façade) and Wang Tao House – alight (middle-upper portion of south-west side façade). The fire had just spread to Wang Tao House.

Additionally, some scaffolding bamboo had collapsed from height onto the ground, causing the fire to spread to the nearby roadside. I inquired the FSCC about the number of Turntable Ladders (“**TLs**”) that had been dispatched and learned that three had been dispatched (with two arrived and one on the way). In view of the fire development, I ordered the attendance of three additional TLs.

9. At that juncture, I met the crew members of Hydraulic Platform (“**HP**”) of Sheung Shui Fire Station (“**SS/HP**”) at Kwong Wang Street near Wang Tao Court, and instructed the Officer-in-Charge, Station Officer (“**StnO**”) CHAN Ka-ying, to address the roadside fire.

[Question 7(b)]

10. At 1548 hours, I met DO LAM at the roundabout near Tai Po Baptist Public School. He reported to me that Mayday operation had been activated for rescuing Senior Fireman (Posthumous) 18469 HO Wai-ho (“**SFn HO**”). I instructed DO LAM to remain the dedicated officer in charge of the Mayday operation.

[Question 9(a) continued]

11. Upon boarding the Mobile Command Unit (“**MCU**”) of Tsim Sha Tsui Fire Station at 1550 hours, I assumed the role of Incident Commander and requested the MCU crew to provide a map detailing the names of the buildings at Wang Fuk Court to assist me with planning the Incident Command System (“**ICS**”). As more fire appliances arrived at the scene and the situation deteriorated rapidly, I urgently needed to implement the ICS for the No. 4 Alarm Fire incident in order to create an integrated organisational structure for the command, control, and coordination of firefighting and rescue operations.

[Question 7(b) continued]

12. At about 1605 hours, DO LAM Ho-chun reported to me that SFn HO, unconscious, was located at the open ground in front of the front entrance of Wang Tai House and received immediate medical assistance on-site. Subsequently, SFn HO was conveyed to the hospital by ambulance.

[Question 9(a) continued]

13. At 1618 hours, AD(NTN) TANG Wing-wah assumed the role of Incident Commander, and I briefed him on the situation regarding the progress of firefighting and rescue operations for the affected buildings as well as the result of the Mayday operation. At 1623 hours, AD(NTN) assigned me the role of Rescue Officer, giving me responsibility for the overall Search and Rescue (“SAR”) operations.

[Question 9(d)]

14. A layout plan showing the allocation and placement of all the water jets and TLs deployed during the period of the No. 4 Alarm Fire when I was the Incident Commander is produced below. The deployment of water jets at the ground was dynamic.



## **Part B: Search, rescue and evacuation**


### **Question 10(b) of Request 4**

15. The fundamental principle governing our SAR operations was centred on operational feasibility – specifically, whether prevailing conditions permitted our SAR teams to safely access the locations where individuals require assistance. The primary determining factors included:
- the status of firefighting progress;
  - the availability of safe access and egress routes;
  - the structural integrity and safety of the affected areas; and
  - the clarity of the location information provided by the caller.
16. Designated Senior Officers (“**Sector Officer**”) for SAR operations of the affected buildings collected information of the assistance calls, formulated and executed rescue strategies tailored to the actual conditions of individual buildings and maintained close coordination with the relevant firefighting and SAR teams. The execution sequence of assistance calls necessarily depended on when tactical conditions allowed for safe rescue operations to commence having regard to the primary determining factors mentioned above. In other words, rescue operations in response to assistance calls might not be strictly prioritised in the order of receipt of the assistance calls, but depending on the actual circumstances of the case. When safe access and egress routes were available, each Sector Officer would deploy available resources for rescue efforts. If more resources were required, the Sector Officer of each building was responsible for requesting additional resources

via the MCU at scene before proceeding with the rescue.

17. The presence of intense heat and smoke created significant challenges for accessing the buildings, making the SAR operations impractical at times. As a result, SAR operations were occasionally suspended. However, the FSD did make multiple attempts to surpass the floors undergoing firefighting operations to effect rescue operations on upper floors, meaning that despite challenges from flames, heat, and dense smoke, SAR teams would and did take risks to advance whenever opportunities arose.
18. Upon receiving assistance calls, our console operators offered safety advice to the callers, which aimed at maximising their chances of successful evacuation or survival while waiting for rescue. Operators advised callers to avoid smoke and to stay calm within their units if heavy smoke was present outside. In those situations, callers were advised to remain calm inside their units and to seal any gaps in the doors. If the corridor was clear of smoke, they were advised to exit quickly using the nearest smoke-free staircase.
19. For details of the safety advice and the relevant departmental guidelines, please refer to paragraphs 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Witness Statement of Deputy Chief Fire Officer (Operational Support and Professional Development), WONG Sze-lut, Sunny dated 29 January 2026.
20. I confirm that the contents of this Witness Statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 20<sup>th</sup> day of February 2026.



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WONG King-man  
Deputy Chief Fire Officer  
Fire Services Department