

**Independent Committee in relation to the
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

WITNESS STATEMENT OF

LI KING-YAN

I, LI King-yan, Chief Inspector of Police, Hong Kong Police Force, of the New Territories North Regional Headquarters, No. 6 On Po Lane, Tai Po, New Territories, Hong Kong do say as follows:-

1. I am the Chief Inspector of Police, Operations, New Territories North, Hong Kong Police Force (“**Force**”) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. I have joined the Force for 17 years since about 2008 and was promoted to the present rank on 8 July 2019. I acted as the Controller of Team 3, Regional Command and Control Centre, New Territories (Temporary) (“**CTRL T3 RCCC NT (T)**”) between 23 November 2025 and 1 February 2026. My main responsibilities as CTRL T3 RCCC NT (T) include overseeing the operation of the Regional Command and Control Centre, New Territories (“**RCCC NT**”) to ensure that all incidents and requests for assistance are responded to quickly and that significant information is disseminated in an accurate manner to frontline officers and when necessary senior officers in the Districts and the Region, and closely monitoring that all incidents are thoroughly and methodically handled.
2. I make this Witness Statement pursuant to the request of the Independent Committee (“**Committee**”) in relation to the fire at

Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po as set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo, Solicitors for the Committee, to the Department of Justice dated 19 January 2026 (“**19 January Letter**”) in which specific questions were raised in paragraphs 1 to 19 (“**Questions**”). Save where otherwise appears, the facts deposed hereto are within my personal knowledge or are derived from office files and records and sources to which I have access and which are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

3. In this Witness Statement, I shall address Questions 18, c., d., and 19, a., i., (i) of the 19 January Letter, and explain the operation of the RCCC NT throughout the Wang Fuk Court Fire Incident (“**Incident**”) during my shift on 26 November 2025. Other Questions which are within the Force’s purview will be addressed in the witness statements of other relevant officers of the Force to the Committee.
4. This Witness Statement is divided into the following parts:-
 - (1) Part A describes the general duties and composition of the RCCC NT;
 - (2) Part B describes the operation and staffing levels of the RCCC NT on 26 November 2025 and the rationale for advising persons calling from inside Wang Fuk Court to stay put and await rescue in answer to Question 18, c. and d.; and
 - (3) Part C describes the deployment of police officers to Wang Fuk Court in answer to Question 19, a., i., (i).

Part A – General Duties and Composition of the RCCC NT

5. The RCCC NT is responsible for the day-to-day control and

coordination of deployable resources and communications in the New Territories North (“NTN”) and New Territories South (“NTS”) regions. It is located at the NTN Regional Headquarters situated at No. 6, On Po Lane, Tai Po, consisting of one Duty Controller (at the rank of Superintendent), two Duty Supervisors (one for NTN region and one for NTS region; at the rank of Inspector/Senior Inspector), each assisted by one Senior Police Communications Officer (“SPCO”), one District Console (namely Tsuen Wan Console, manned by two Sergeants (“SGTs”) and two Police Communications Officers (“PCOs”)) and 12 Divisional Consoles (each manned by one SGT and one PCO), two Traffic Consoles (NTN and NTS, each manned by one SGT and one PCO), one “999” Console (manned by two SPCOs and between 8 and 10 PCOs) and two Orderly responsible for administrative support (at the rank of PCOs). I attach hereto as **Annex 1** a diagram showing the staffing structure of the RCCC NT. The RCCC NT is operated on a three-shift system on a daily basis.

6. My main responsibilities are to ensure a rapid response to and handling of “999” emergency calls received by the RCCC NT, timely and accurate dissemination of information, coordination amongst the Force and other emergency resources, and reporting to the Public Relations Wing of the Force as required, depending on the nature of the incidents concerned and their severity. For instance, in the event of a major incident or disaster, I would report them in a timely manner to the Regional/District Headquarters and, when appropriate, hand over the command of the incident from the RCCC NT to the Regional Higher Command (“HICOM”) for further actions.

Part B – The Operation and Staffing levels of the RCCC NT on 26 November 2025 and the Rationale for Advising Persons Calling from inside Wang Fuk Court to Stay Put and Await Rescue

7. At 1500 hours on 26 November 2025, the “999” Console of the RCCC NT was initially manned by two SPCOs and 10 PCOs. Given the large number of “999” calls being received, 5 PCOs were redeployed from the Divisional Consoles of the RCCC NT to the “999” Console of the RCCC NT for reinforcement at 1508 hours.

8. There were nine “999” calls in which the PCOs gave advice that the persons inside Wang Fuk Court stay put and await rescue. Of the nine calls, six calls were made by persons calling from inside Wang Fuk Court and three calls were made by persons calling outside the buildings of Wang Fuk Court for their family members or friends inside Wang Fuk Court. The callers told the PCOs responding to the “999” calls that they or their family members or friends stayed inside their home due to the heavy smoke outside their unit. Based on the general understanding of the public advice given by the Fire Services Department (“FSD”) on domestic fire escape, which is that people should return to their unit or find a safe place to take shelter if there is no safe passage to leave, the responding PCOs responded to eight callers by advising to stay put and/or stay at a safe location and one caller by advising to seal the gaps between the door and door frame with wet towels while transferring their calls to the Ambulance/Fire Control for FSD’s further professional assistance and advice. I understand that a further updated list of “999” callers (“**Further Updated List of ‘999’ Callers**”) has been prepared under

the supervision of HO Kit-ye, Chief Police Communications Officer, which will be attached as Annex 1 to her Witness Statement to be submitted to the Committee. With reference to the Police reference number (“**Police Ref. No.**”) in the Further Updated List of “999” Callers, the said nine “999” calls were Police Ref. No. P70, P81, P91, P101, P102, P121, P131, P143 and P155.

Part C – Deployment of Police Officers to Wang Fuk Court

The Incident Timeline on 26 November 2025

9. On 26 November 2025, I was on B shift duty (1500 hours to 2330 hours) as CTRL T3 RCCC NT (T).
10. At 1510 hours on the same day, I was informed by the Duty Supervisor RCCC NTN that there was a fire at Wang Fuk Court and the RCCC NT had received many “999” calls reporting that the scaffolding surrounding Wang Cheong House was on fire. Upon receiving the “999” calls, the RCCC NT had already forwarded the “999” calls to the Ambulance/Fire Control. The RCCC NT tagged the Incident to the Public Relations Wing, and tasked (i) the Emergency Unit, NTN Region (“**EU NTN**”) (EU Cars 88 and 89), (ii) the Police Tactical Unit NTN Region (“**PTU NTN**”) Platoon 3 originally tasked for patrolling in Tai Po District, (iii) the District Traffic Team, Tai Po District, and (iv) Patrol Sub-unit, Tai Po Division to proceed to the scene. EU Car 89 was first deployed to Wang Fuk Court at 1452 hours and arrived at the scene at 1459 hours.
11. Looking out of the window of the RCCC NT towards Wang Fuk Court, I saw thick smoke emitting from the area of Wang Fuk Court.

I immediately instructed RCCC NT officers to task officers at scene to set up a Forward Control Point (“**FCP**”) as quickly as possible. The FCP is generally the first control to be established at or near the scene of an incident. The primary function of the FCP is to provide a command facility for the Tactical Commander, through which he/she will direct and coordinate all actions at the scene, as effective and multifarious communication facilities are essential. Initially, the FCP may simply be a Police vehicle or nearby premises with a telephone. However, as more manpower and resources arrive, it will usually be necessary for the FCP to move to a larger premises near the scene or to the Mobile Command Unit or Mobile Command Post. I also instructed the Traffic Console to request assistance from Traffic NTN to manage traffic in the vicinity of Wang Fuk Court, ensuring that rescue vehicles could reach the scene safely and quickly.

12. Around 1515 hours, I heard from the beat radio that the acting Assistant Divisional Commander (Operations) of Tai Po Division had arrived at the scene.
13. At 1520 hours, I informed the acting Senior Superintendent, Operations, NTN of the Incident, who then informed the Regional Commander, NTN and Deputy District Commander, Tai Po District of the same. Then, I was informed by the Duty Supervisor RCCC NTN that the RCCC NT received the first “999” call requesting rescue at Wang Tai House and Wang Sun House at 1513 hours and 1521 hours respectively, suggesting that the fire had spread out to Wang Tai House and Wang Sun House. As a result, the Police Duty Officer (“**PDO**”) at the Headquarters and Command Control Centre


(“HQCCC”) was informed and PTU NTN Platoon 4 was redeployed to proceed to the scene for reinforcement. At 1522 hours, I heard from the beat radio that the Superintendent of EU NTN had deployed his officers for assistance.

14. At 1530 hours, the RCCC NT received the first “999” call requesting rescue at Wang Kin House. The RCCC NT forwarded the “999” call to the Ambulance/Fire Control immediately and updated the ground duties. Then, I heard from the beat radio that the acting Company Second-in-command of PTU NTN was proceeding to the scene.
15. At 1540 hours, the NTN HICOM was activated to take over the command of the Incident.
16. At 1603 hours, the RCCC NT requested reinforcement by the PTU from other Regions through the PDO.
17. At 1619 hours, the RCCC NT received the first “999” call requesting rescue at Wang Yan House. The RCCC NT forwarded the “999” call to the Ambulance/Fire Control immediately and updated the ground duties and the NTN HICOM.
18. At 1630 hours, I learnt that the HQCCC had redeployed PTU Foxtrot Company Platoon 3, PTU Alfa Company Platoon 3, PTU Yankee Company Platoon 2, and PTU Echo Company Platoon 4 for reinforcement, and I updated the NTN HICOM and the FCP of the same.
19. At 1633 hours, the RCCC NT received the first “999” call requesting rescue at Wang Shing House. The RCCC NT forwarded the “999”

call to the Ambulance/Fire Control immediately and updated the ground duties and the NTN HICOM.

20. At 1643 hours, the RCCC NT received the first “999” call requesting rescue at Wang Tao House. The RCCC NT forwarded the “999” call to the Ambulance/Fire Control immediately and updated the ground duties and the NTN HICOM.
21. At 1736 hours, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Operation declared the fire as a “Major Incident”. The RCCC NT updated the ground duties and the NTN HICOM.
22. At 1907 hours, the RCCC NT updated the Incident Command Centre (“**ICC**”), which had previously been termed the HICOM until the declaration of the “Major Incident”, that representatives from the Independent Inspection Unit of the Housing Department (“**HD**”) and from the Buildings Department (“**BD**”) had arrived at scene for assistance. With a view to ascertaining the structural safety of the 7 affected buildings, representatives from the HD and the BD were called upon by RCCC NT for preliminary inspections.
23. I confirm that the contents of this Witness Statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 24th day of February 2026.



LI King-yan