

**Independent Committee in relation to the
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

Witness Statement of HUI Kin-on

I, HUI Kin-on, of Tai Po Fire Station (“**TPFStn**”), New Territories North Command, Fire Services Department, 3 Ting Kok Road, Tai Po, N.T., do say as follows:-

1. I am the Senior Station Officer (“**SSStnO**”) of the Fire Services Department (“**FSD**”) of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. I have joined the FSD for about 13 years since 2013 and was promoted to the present rank on 6 July 2018. My main responsibility is to act as Watch Commander to lead one of the Watches in TPFStn (i.e. one of the teams of firefighters on shift).
2. I make this Witness Statement pursuant to Request 4 of the Independent Committee (“**Committee**”) in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po as set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo, Solicitors from the Committee, to the FSD dated 4 February 2026 (“**4 February Letter**”) in which specific questions were raised in paragraphs 1 to 10 and 16 (“**Questions**”). Save where otherwise appears, the facts deposed hereto are within my personal knowledge or are derived from office files and records and sources to which I have access and are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Save as otherwise specified, this Witness Statement adopts the same abbreviations and nomenclature as in the 4 February Letter.
3. This Witness Statement addresses Questions 6, 7(a), 7(b), 8, 9(a), 9(c) and 9(d) of the 4 February Letter. Other Questions which are within the FSD’s purview will be addressed in the witness statements of other relevant officers of the FSD to the Committee.
4. The following section sets out (i) my personal knowledge regarding the initial location and spread of the fire, the FSD’s initial assessments, decisions, and firefighting tactics in answer to **Question 6**; (ii) the duties which SFn Ho was tasked with, the circumstances in which communications with him became lost, and the search and rescue operations conducted to locate him in answer to

Questions 7(a) and 7(b); and (iii) the decisions made by me as the initial Incident Commander of the fire in answer to **Questions 8, 9(a), 9(c) and 9(d).**

Questions 6, 7(a), 7(b), 8, 9(a), 9(c) and 9(d) of the 4 February Letter

[Questions 6 and 8]

5. As stated in paragraph 9 of the 1st Witness Statement of TANG Wing-wah dated 16 January 2026, I was the officer-in-charge (“**Oic**”) of the first fire appliance that arrived at Wang Fuk Court and was the Incident Commander of the No. 1 Alarm Fire (from 1451 hours to 1501 hours). I understand that there were other first responders involved at the initial stage of the incident and that their witness statements are still in progress of being taken by the Hong Kong Police Force Against such background, I, as the Incident Commander of the initial stage of the fire as well as one of the key first responders, hereby provide response to Question 6. The response should be read together with the timeline and account of the No. 1 Alarm Fire provided in paragraphs 8 to 17 of the 1st Witness Statement of TANG Wing-wah dated 16 January 2026.
6. From 0900 hours on 26 November 2025 to 0900 hours on 27 November 2025, I was on duty at TPFStn, serving as the Watch Commander and Oic of the Hydraulic Platform of TPFStn (“**TP/HP**”).
7. At 1451 hours on 26 November 2025, I received a report of No. 1 Alarm Fire at Wang Cheong House, Wang Fuk Court from the Fire Services Communications Centre (“**FSCC**”). The caller provided information as follows: “fire involving scaffolding on external wall with explosion occurred”. I departed from TPFStn together with the crews of TP/HP including 1 Senior Fireman and 4 Firemen and arrived at Wang Fuk Court at 1456 hours.
8. TP/HP was parked at the roundabout outside the front entrance of Wang Cheong House (i.e. at the north-west side of the block)) (*Layout Plan (1) refers*). Upon arrival at the scene, I did not see any fire or smoke on the façade of Wang Cheong House facing Kwong Wang Street and nearby buildings.



Layout Plan (1): Siting of TP/HP

9. Given no fire or smoke was noted on the façade of Wang Cheong House facing Kwong Wang Street, a passer-by led me to the rear façade of Wang Cheong House facing Island House Lane via the pedestrian pathway between Wang Cheong House and Wang Shing House. At the open ground near the rear exit of Wang Cheong House (i.e. at the east side of the block between flat 4 and flat 5), I noted the scaffolding structures at the exterior of Wang Cheong House facing Island House Lane was well alight (*Layout Plan (2) refers*). The area on fire measured approximately 8 meters in width by 30 meters in height, from ground floor to about the eighth / ninth floor.



Layout Plan (2): The fire noted by SStnO HUI Kin-on

[Question 9(a)]

10. At about 1457 hours, I directed crew members to lay fire hoses and deploy 2 water jets for firefighting towards the lower portion of scaffolding structures at the exterior of Wang Cheong House facing Island House Lane. I observed that the fire was vertically spreading upward along the scaffolding structure rapidly. A large quantity of burning bamboo, wooden planks, and miscellaneous articles were falling from height of Wang Cheong House to the open ground on ground floor. These burning articles piled up and blocked the rear exit of Wang Cheong House facing Island House Lane. I also noted the fire spread from the rear re-entrant of Wang Cheong House facing Island House Lane to its south-east side.
11. At about 1459 hours, I returned to the roundabout outside Wang Cheong House. I noted the fire had already spread from the rear façade of Wang Cheong House facing Island House Lane to its west façade via flying embers. At the same time, I also noted that the open ground near the front entrance of Wang Cheong House was well alight. Certain burning materials, including flames and other indistinguishable combustibles, were carried by the wind from the direction of Wang Cheong House to Wang Tai House. At 1500 hours, I noted that the fire spread from Wang Cheong House to Wang Tai House (the east façade) (*Layout Plan (3) refers*).



Layout Plan (3): Fire spread from Wang Cheong House to Wang Tai House

[Question 9(c)]

12. At 1502 hours, there was a rapid spread of fire among different façades of Wang Cheong House, and the mid-lower level of east façade of Wang Tai House was well alight. At the time of my arrival, I observed that there were no evacuees from the front entrance of Wang Cheong House. In view of the fire development and potential large number of residents trapped therein, I upgraded the fire to No. 3 Alarm, so as to request additional manpower and appliances resources to the scene.

[Question 7(a)]

13. After my upgrade of fire to No. 3 Alarm, I noted a number of residents evacuating from various buildings. I directed my crew members to evacuate them to place of safety. At about 1503 hours, I received a message from the FSCC of an assistance call at Room 2701 of Wang Cheong House. I thus ordered Probationary Station Officer LIAO Kong-lap (“**PStnO LIAO**”), Oic of Major Pump (“**MP**”) of Sha Tin Fire Station (“**ST/MP**”), to handle this assistance call. PStnO LIAO instructed Senior Fireman (Posthumous) 18469 HO Wai-ho (“**SFn HO**”), Fireman 17569 YEUNG Ching and Fireman 22662 SIU Tsz-ho of Light Rescue Unit of Sha Tin Fire Station (“**ST/LRU**”) to respond to this assistance call. At the same time, I noted that the Rubbish Collection Point on the ground floor of Wang Fuk Court was well alight due to the burning flying embers. As the fire was close to TP/HP posing an imminent danger to it, I directed crew members of TP/HP to extinguish that fire.

[Question 9(a) continued]

14. At about 1505 hours, a large quantity of burning bamboo, wooden planks, and miscellaneous articles continued to fall from height of Wang Cheong House. These burning articles piled up and blocked the front entrance of Wang Cheong House. I deployed 3 additional water jets for extinguishing the fire at the façades of Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House facing the roundabout, and that on the open ground near the front entrance of Wang Cheong House. Attempts were made simultaneously to remove the blockage at the same time.
15. As at 1505 hours, different façades of Wang Cheong House (with both the front entrance and rear exit blocked), the open ground near the front entrance of Wang Cheong House, and the mid-lower level of the east façade of Wang Tai House were well alight. In total, I deployed 5 water jets for Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House.

16. Between 1505 hours and 1520 hours, I deployed members for continuous firefighting at the external façades of Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House and the open ground between Wang Cheong Court and Wang Tai Court. I also deployed members for assisting with evacuation from different buildings by redirecting evacuees to place of safety.
17. At about 1520 hours, a large amount of burning scaffolding structure, including bamboo, wooden planks, and miscellaneous articles, at the external wall of Wang Tai House facing the roundabout fell from height. These burning articles piled up and blocked the front entrance of Wang Tai House (i.e. at the east side of the block). At the same time, I instructed Turntable Ladder of Tai Po East Fire Station (“**TPE/TL**”), which was parked at the roundabout, to apply water monitor to Wang Cheong House and Wang Tai House on the side of the external wall facing the roundabout. I noted fire spread to Wang Shing House, its south-west façade (portion of middle to upper floors) was alight. As such, I also instructed TPE/TL to apply water monitor to Wang Shing House on its south-west façade facing the roundabout. The MP of Ma On Shan Fire Station (“**MOS/MP**”), which had been supplying water to TPE/TL, was damaged at about 1520 hours after its exhaust pipe was hit and damaged by falling debris from height of nearby buildings. As such, the water supply to TPE/TL was taken over by MP of Fanling Fire Station at about 1525 hours.
18. At 1519 hours, Assistant Divisional Officer CHEUNG Lok-hang (“**ADO CHEUNG**”) arrived at the scene and took on the role of Incident Commander.

[Question 7(b)]

19. At about 1522 hours, I heard a Mayday message through radio telephone (“**R/T**”). The message stated: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, (i.e. the dots mean the words from the distressed member were muffled which I could not interpret), 而家被困係 30 樓。” I was only able to recognise the words “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday” and “而家被困係 30 樓”. I responded via R/T: “Mayday, Mayday, Mayday, 你喺咩位置。” However, I could not hear any response. At that time, I did not know the number and identity of the distressed member(s) nor his/their exact location. However, the fire at Wang Cheong House was extremely severe with heavy smoke. Since the fire originated at Wang Cheong House, I assessed that the distressed member(s) was/were most likely trapped on 30/F of Wang Cheong House. Accordingly, I directed crew members of TP/MP and TP/HP to apply water jets to the front entrance of Wang Cheong House to suppress the fire thereat and to clear an access as quickly as

possible for carrying out the rescue operation for the distressed member(s).

20. At 1523 hours, I met ADO CHOW Tsz-ho and ADO CHEUNG at the roundabout near Wang Tai House. I reported to ADO CHEUNG about the firefighting and an assistance call at Room 2701 of Wang Cheong House. I also reported to him about the contents of the Mayday message I heard through R/T at 1522 hours. I informed him that in response to the Mayday message, I formed 4 Emergency Response Teams (“ERT”) including the crew members of TP/MP and TP/HP to clear access to the interior of Wang Cheong House for carrying out the rescue operation for the distressed member(s). He tasked me to continue the Mayday operation.
21. At the roundabout near the front entrance of Wang Cheong House, PStnO LIAO reported to me that the Mayday message sender was SFn HO of ST/LRU. On request from PStnO LIAO, I instructed him to form the fifth ERT for clearing an access and carrying out the rescue operation for SFn HO.

[Question 9(d)]

22. A layout plan showing the allocation and placement of all the water jets and turntable ladder deployed during the period of the No. 1 Alarm Fire when I was the Incident Commander is produced below (*Layout Plan (4) refers*).



Layout Plan (4): Allocation and placement of all the water jets and turntable ladder deployed during the period of the No. 1 Alarm Fire

23. I confirm that the contents of this Witness Statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 19th day of February 2026.



HUI Kin-on

Senior Station Officer

Fire Services Department