

**Independent Committee in relation to the
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

4th Witness Statement of KEUNG Sai-ming

I, KEUNG Sai-ming, of Licensing and Certification Command, Fire Services Department, 5th Floor, South Wing, Fire Services Headquarters Building, 1 Hong Chong Road, Tsim Sha Tsui East, Kowloon, do say as follows:-

1. I am the same KEUNG Sai-ming who gave witness statements dated 16 January 2026 (“**my 1st Witness Statement**”), 13 February 2026 (“**my 2nd Witness Statement**”) and 13 March 2026 (“**my 3rd Witness Statement**”) to the Independent Committee (“**Committee**”) in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po. Save as otherwise specified, this Witness Statement adopts the same abbreviations and nomenclature as my previous statements. As requested by the Committee, this Witness Statement is to be lodged with the Committee by noon on 7 April 2026. In view of such time constraint, I would focus on the key aspects here. I stand ready to assist the Committee to answer any further questions in the Evidential Hearing.

2. I make this 4th Witness Statement pursuant to (A) Request 8 of the Committee as set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo, Solicitors for the Committee dated 30 March 2026 in which specific questions were raised in paragraphs 1 and 3 to 4 regarding inspections conducted at Wang Fuk Court and (B) Request 9 of the Committee as set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo dated 2 April 2026 in which specific questions were raised in paragraphs 1 to 3 regarding the report of FSI at Wang Fuk Court, and also (C) to provide additional information for the following purposes: (1) to clarify the misunderstanding that

the FSD has approved 16 extensions of FSI shutdown and that the FSD had only followed up the case in 4 months' time; (2) to explain why the FSD did not verify that the fire alarm system ("FAS") of Wang Fuk Court was not in efficient working order during the inspections; (3-4) to highlight the FSD's key observations and understanding on suspected misconduct or negligence committed by Victory Fire Engineering Limited ("Victory") and China Status Development and Engineering Company Limited ("China Status") based on information available to the FSD at the time of preparation of this statement (for the avoidance of doubt, in view of time constraint, this Witness Statement merely seeks to highlight some key points without responding to all matters or evidence from Victory and China Status); (5) to clarify the misunderstanding that the annual inspection of Wang Fuk Court shall follow the latest version of the "Code of Practice" (as defined below); (6) to respond to the allegation that the industry does not completely understand how to complete the annual inspection checklist; (7) to explain verification of the "Annual Inspection Checklists"; (8) to state the ongoing efforts to enhance fire safety governance after Wang Fuk Court fire; and (9) to state the medium and long-term measures to address the issues identified from this incident. Save where otherwise appears, the facts deposed hereto are within my personal knowledge or are derived from office files and records and sources to which I have access and are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

3. I understand that the FSD will produce to the Committee a List of Documents ("LoD"), a draft of which I have read, indexing all relevant documents in the FSD's possession. In this Witness Statement, I shall refer to these documents by their designation in the LoD (for example, [FSD/A(1)/1] means Item 1 in Part

A(I) of the 1st LoD) without annexing them hereto for the avoidance of duplication. Where reference to a document in the hearing bundle is made, reference to [B2/A(I)/1/1] is to [Bundle/part/item/page].

(A) **Whether “Prior Notice” would be given before Inspections (Answer to Request 8)**

4. In general, for inspections related to complaint-driven cases conducted by the FSD, no prior notice will be given because notifying the subject of a complaint-based inspection beforehand could potentially compromise the integrity of the investigation and undermine the fairness of the enforcement actions. On the other hand, prior notice will be given for inspections related to matters including the functional audit of FSIs, particularly the testing of FSI systems that will trigger the actuation of alarms, because such testing necessitates early notification of occupants to prevent panic or unnecessary evacuation. Also, prior notice will be given for the testing of booster pumps in construction sites, because it requires the assistance to be rendered by the concerned RFSIC or registered general building contractor. Appointment will also be made with operators of certain premises, such as mini-storage premises, where they are typically locked to prevent any misunderstanding of unauthorised entry.

5. In respect of the inspections conducted by the FSD at Wang Fuk Court between 1 July 2024 and 26 November 2025 (which are set out in my 1st Witness Statement), I confirm that no prior notice was given to the renovation contractors / registered inspectors / building management. According to our records, whilst those inspections were not related to complaint-driven cases, they did not require the testing of FSIs and hence no

advance notice was required to be given.

(B) Report of FSI of Wang Fuk Court (“Report”)
(Answer to Request 9)

6. The table at paragraph 3.2 of the Report only recorded the situation of the F.S. tanks and transfer tanks for each block of Wang Fuk Court as observed during the mentioned date / time of the inspections and has no correlation to the date / times at which the photographs shown at Appendix II to the Report were taken.
7. The original Report has been updated by the Fire Protection [FSD(10)/D(III)/1] Facilities Supervision Division. The table at paragraph 3.2 of the Report has now been updated to include photographs of the interior of the F.S. tanks and transfer tanks of all blocks of Wang Fuk Court as at the date / times shown in the table. Further, the photographs shown at Appendix II to the Report have now been dated.
8. For the avoidance of doubt, **no conclusive evidence** can be drawn from the Report on the actual status of the F.S. tanks and transfer tanks of all blocks of Wang Fuk Court right before the fire on 26 November 2025 because of *inter alia* the following uncertainties: **(1)** an F.S. tank might have been emptied as a result of residents using the HR or firefighters using the FH (because even though the main switch was off, water could still come down from the F.S. tank and come out of the FH/HR systems at the lower floors by gravity), and **(2)** an F.S. tank (like the one in Wang Tao and Wang Shing) might have been filled up as a result of firefighters pumping a lot of water into FH/HR system.

(C) Supplementary Information**(1) To clarify the misunderstanding that the FSD had “approved” 16 extensions of FSI shutdown and that the FSD had only followed up the case in 4 months’ time**

9. Under s.7 of Cap. 95B, no person other than a registered contractor shall maintain, inspect or repair any fire service installation or equipment which is installed in any premises. Shutting down any FSI is considered as an act that can only be carried out by an RFSIC. According to the FSD Circular Letter No. 1/2021, a set of handling procedures of shutdown of FSI to be followed by RFSICs have been formulated. Once defects of any FSI are identified, the owner of the relevant FSI shall appoint an RFSIC to carry out rectification works. The proper carrying out of maintenance works of the relevant FSI is premised on the professional judgement of the RFSIC and the contractual arrangement between the FSI owner and RFSIC regarding the maintenance / modification / repair of the relevant FSI. The FSD is not privy to the engagement process nor the contractual negotiations and therefore will not be directly involved in the technical content of the works. The RFSIC engaged will inspect the FSI and if there is a need for them to be shut down for maintenance / modification / repair overnight or for more than 24 hours continuously, the RFSIC will notify the FSD of the shutdown. However, the notification system for FSI shutdown is not an approval mechanism as the RFSICs should bear the ultimate responsibility in certifying the FSIs are in efficient working order. Hence, the RFSICs are expected to exercise their professional skills and judgement and are thus not required to obtain prior approval before shutting down the FSI system under the current SDN regime.

[B2/A(III)/1/1302]

[B2/A(II)/2/883]

Para 1.14

10. According to our experience, only a very small portion of repair works could be completed within 14 days while the rest requires longer time ranging between weeks and months to conclude. Although many repair works require months to complete, such repair works should not go on continuously without proper supervision and follow-up by RFSICs. Besides, the FSD does not intend to leave cases unattended for such long period without follow-up. As such, the requirement for SDN (and their extension) to be reported to the FSD in 14 days intervals is designed to ensure that the RFSIC is actively and consciously making a professional assessment that an extension is required and to enable the FSD: (1) to verify that the repair works are being overseen by an RFSIC; (2) to be informed of the latest RFSIC responsible for the repair works; and (3) to ascertain whether the relevant RFSIC may have been removed from the register upon any disciplinary board decision during the course of the repair works. Where a case is found to be in lack of an extension or an RFSIC has ceased to follow-up on the works, the FSD will take appropriate follow-up measures to ensure proper follow-up of the FSI works.
11. We also note that there are misunderstandings about the 4-month timing set for bringing up the case. Our monitoring mechanism is two-tiered. In this case, one officer will estimate the duration of the repair works based on the details of the repair works according to the information gathered, and bring up all ongoing shutdown cases under his purview with a milestone date in not more than 4 months. Meanwhile, in order to ensure constant and regular supervision and follow-up by authorised experts (i.e. RFSIC), another officer is responsible for monitoring the continued submission of SDN with extension notification in Part II by RFSIC every 14 days. The function of the second officer's effort is to ensure the

continuous engagement of the RFSIC as mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Therefore, the 4-month timing is only a milestone date for the first officer to bring up the case for his periodic review and does not diminish the second officer's responsibility to monitor the timely submission of the SDN with extension notification in Part II by RFSIC.

(2) Why the FSD did not verify whether the FAS of Wang Fuk Court was in efficient working order during the inspections

12. The FSD carried out inspections at Wang Fuk Court upon receipt of complaints, notifications of shutdown or defects of FSI before the fire. Meanwhile, the SDNs submitted by China Status for each building stated that only the FH/HR system was shut down, with the entry for the FAS being left unticked, so that the FSD was under the false impression that the FAS was functioning normally all along. An audit mechanism is in place to verify the functionalities of FSI systems or performance of RFSICs on a random sampling basis, though Wang Fuk Court had not been selected for audit checking.

Roles of RFSICs involved in Wang Fuk Court

13. The FSD is responsible for registration of fire service installation contractors, and when necessary, referring their conviction, improper conduct or negligence to the Disciplinary Board. I would like to take this opportunity to highlight the FSD's key observations and understanding on the roles of the following two RFSICs, namely Victory and China Status, based on information available to the FSD at the time of preparation of this statement.

(3) Victory

14. The current notification mechanism of FSI Shutdown has been implemented for years and is extensively adopted by the industry. Victory was engaged by Wang Fuk Court to repair defects of the FH/HR system and FAS discovered during the last Annual Inspection completed in March 2025. Therefore, it was required to notify the FSD when its staff discovered during the course of repairs that the F.S. Water Tanks (a component of FH/HR system) of certain blocks were empty and that the main power switches of all 8 blocks were in off position (which would also de-energise the FAS). Furthermore, it is an explicit requirement under the FSD Circular Letter No. 1/2021 for written notification to be made to the FSD if shutdown is arising from situations which may, in the event of fire, put the entire building in jeopardy; having an empty water tank is listed as an example. Plainly, the main power switches being in off position would also fall within such ambit. On the former, the F.S. Water Tank is designed to provide temporary water supply to hose reel points and fire hydrant outlets in the building for firefighting at the initial stage of a fire; an empty F.S. Water Tank would hinder the ability of occupants and firefighters to use the hose reel and firefighting hose respectively and therefore jeopardise the fire safety of the entire building. On the latter, the deactivation of the FAS would plainly hinder the ability of occupants to escape in the event of fire and jeopardise the fire safety of the entire building too. Therefore, quite apart from China Status, Victory was equally required to notify the FSD when the F.S. Water Tanks were found empty and the main power switches were found in off position during the course of the repair of the FH/HR system and FAS. In any case and at the very least, Victory could and should have liaised and verified with China Status on the same, and further notify the FSD as appropriate. [B2/A(III)/1/1303]

Victory, therefore, failed to notify all relevant parties given Victory's role, and in any event as required in the FSD Circular Letter No. 1/2021.

(4) China Status

15. Prior to the commencement of the repair works of F.S. Water Tanks supervised by the main contractor (Prestige Constructions & Engineering Co. Limited), it is now revealed (by its own evidence) that China Status had issued various SDNs and FS 251s without conducting any on-site inspection to assess the need for the shutdown of the subject FSIs, nor to effect shutdown of the FSI systems themselves. Therefore, China Status not only failed the expectation of the public, but also breached the FSD's trust by falsely representing to the FSD that it was the relevant RFSIC carrying out the relevant repair works based on the defect(s) as detected. Moreover, the relevant FS 251s were not provided to the FSD with the corresponding SDNs until October 2025, and descriptions of defects in the concerned FS 251s have misled the FSD by giving the impression that the shutdown of the FSI was due to repairs needed as a result of "leakage of F.S water tanks" (without mentioning "empty tanks", let alone the plan to use the F.S. Water Tanks for other purposes, or indeed the shutdown of the FAS).

16. In this regard, I should add that, as explained in the police statement of NG Chun-chung (Probationary Station Officer then stationed at Tai Po Fire Station) [C3-1/III(6)/1805-1823]), he called Ivan Leung of China Status on 9 September 2025 at around noon and was told that the shutdown of FH/HR was due to repair works of the water tank (again without mentioning "empty tanks", let alone the plan to use the F.S. Water Tanks

for other purposes, or indeed the shutdown of the FAS). A risk assessment visit was carried out afterwards on the same day during which it was verified that, as per what was related to the FSD by China Status, fire extinguishers had been put in place in accordance with the relevant protocol. As explained in the same statement, there was no inspection of any FSI other than a random sampling of the fire hose (消防喉轆) to ascertain the fire extinguishers as standby means were in place. Based on the information available to him, the officer did not inspect other FSI (including the FAS) as he had no reason at the time to go behind or to doubt what had been positively represented to him, i.e. that water tank maintenance works were being carried out (which resulted in the shutdown of the FH/HR system, without any hint of the shutdown of the FAS).

Other Information

17. In addition to the above, I provide some information below which might assist the Committee to better understand some issues brought up previously in this hearing up to date.

(5) To clarify the misunderstanding that the annual inspection of Wang Fuk Court shall follow the latest version of the “Code of Practice”

18. When asked which version of the Code of Practice for Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Installations and Equipment (“CoP”) applies during the annual inspection of FSI at Wang Fuk Court¹, Mr. Chung Kit-man, the director of Victory, claimed that according to information from the FSD,

¹ see Transcript Day 6 page 7 line 3 to page 8 line 15

the latest version of the CoP (2022) applies to the repair works, while the version of the CoP prevailing at the time of the erection of the building (1984) applies to the annual inspection.

19. Mr Chung's understanding of the FSD's stance is not correct. The FSD's stance is that both the repair works and the annual inspection of the FSI shall be carried out in accordance with the specific CoP that was in force at the time when the building plan for Wang Fuk Court was first submitted for approval. This requirement is stipulated in paragraph 1.14 of the CoP which reads, "The provision and specification of FSIs shall follow:- (i) the appropriate version of Code of Practice for Minimum Fire Service Installations and Equipment applicable to the FSIs installed in the buildings/premises [...]".

[B2/A(II)/2/883]

Para 1.14

(6) To respond to the allegation that the industry does not completely understand how to complete the Annual Inspection Checklist

20. In response to the allegation that the industry has queries about completing the Annual Inspection Checklist, I wish to clarify that no adverse comment has been received during Fire Safety Standards Advisory Group Meetings or the liaison meetings between the FSD and Association of Registered Fire Service Installation Contractors of Hong Kong since the launch of the various Annual Inspection Checklists. The FSD also regularly organises online sharing session, namely "FSD Connects". The FSD has not received any adverse feedback from the industry whether via the official occasions as stated herein or otherwise.

(7) Verification of "Annual Inspection Checklists"

21. RFSICs shall conduct Annual Inspections against the Checklists, which specify the minimum requirements. In addition, they shall, after inspection, complete such Checklists. Under the audit mechanism, the RFSICs shall produce the completed checklists for verification by the FSD upon request. By verifying the completed Checklists, which would comprehensively reflect the status of different parts, the FSD would be able to confirm that the items listed on the checklists are properly covered by the relevant FS 251.

(8) Ongoing efforts to enhance fire safety governance after the Wang Fuk Court fire

22. Following the Wang Fuk Court fire, the FSD has engaged property management stakeholders, including the Property Management Services Authority and various housing associations, to elevate fire safety awareness and prevention. A key agreement was to inspect and repair FSIs before major renovations, ensuring continuous operation. Furthermore, escape routes must remain clear, and FSI shutdowns should not coincide with major building works.
23. The FSD has implemented immediate fire safety measures for buildings with FSI shutdowns. These include comprehensive FSI testing, conducted in coordination with the Independent Checking Unit (ICU) and the Buildings Department, completing functional tests on FSIs in 461 buildings undergoing major renovation by January 2026. This involved testing the fire alarm and FH/HR systems, verifying additional fire safety measures for reported FSI shutdowns, and noting that non-operational FSIs can halt renovation commencement. Furthermore, a Quick Response Team has been established to assess FSI operation during fires and test FSI post-operation.

Furthermore, measures have been enhanced for resident alertness and FSI control through circulars (FSD Circulars Nos. 1 and 2/2026) that mandate prominent notices about FSI shutdowns, mailbox notifications, clear marking of non-operational installations, and sealing of FSI power switches by RFSICs.

(9) Medium-term and Long-term Measures

24. The FSD has launched a risk-based FSI inspection program, prioritising 1,500 high-risk buildings within two months after the fire and commencing a two-year inspection of 5,000 buildings since April 2026. Regularisation of this program is under consideration.

25. In the long term, the FSD is undertaking legislative amendments to enhance fire safety governance. These amendments include strengthening FSI regulation by requiring the FSD's approval for major shutdowns to ensure necessity and accountability. A Responsible Person System will be introduced, establishing statutory responsibilities for property management companies, encompassing semi-annual alarm tests, annual fire drills, regular escape route inspections, and strict adherence to FSD-prescribed fire safety measures during FSI shutdown. Furthermore, the FSD plans to reform the RFSIC registration and disciplinary system, increase penalties for false or misleading FSI certificates, introduce a fixed penalty system for certain easily identifiable fire-related offenses, and grant FSD personnel broader investigation and enforcement power.

Dated this 6th day of April 2026.



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