

**Independent Committee in relation to the
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

2nd Witness Statement of TANG Wing-wah

I, TANG Wing-wah, of New Territories North Command, Fire Services Department, 28 Yuen Wo Road, Shatin, N.T., do say as follows:-

1. I make this 2nd Witness Statement pursuant to Request 4 of the Committee ("**Committee**") as set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo, Solicitors for the Committee, to the FSD dated 4 February 2026 ("**4 February Letter**") in which specific questions were raised in paragraphs 1 to 10 and 16 ("**Questions**"). Save where otherwise appears, the facts deposed hereto are within my personal knowledge or are derived from office files and records and sources to which I have access and are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Save as otherwise specified, this Witness Statement adopts the same abbreviations and nomenclature as in the 4 February Letter.
2. This Witness Statement addresses Questions 2, 3, 8, 9 and 10(d) of the 4 February Letter. Other Questions which are within FSD's purview will be addressed in the witness statements of other relevant officers of FSD to the Committee. I understand that FSD has indexed all relevant documents in its possession in Lists of Documents produced on various dates (collectively "**LoD**") and a 4th List of Documents ("**4th LoD**") to be produced, a draft of which I have read. In this Witness Statement, I shall refer to these documents by their designation in the LoD (for example, [**FSD/A(I)/1**] means Item 1 in Part A(I) of the LoD, [**FSD(2)/A(I)/1**] means Item 1 in Part A(I) of the 2nd LoD, and so on) without annexing them hereto for the avoidance of duplication.

3. This Witness Statement is divided into the following parts:-
 - (1) **Part A** outlines the key considerations and the ways in which FSD works alongside different government departments and utility service providers concerning water, gas and electricity supply at the scene of fire in answer to **Questions 2 and 3**;
 - (2) **Part B** describes the material events and decisions made by me at the scene of the fire in answer to **Questions 8 and 9**; and
 - (3) **Part C** provides further information of how the figure of 250 self-evacuated residents was obtained in answer to **Question 10(d)**.

Part A: Water, gas and electricity supply

Question 2 of Request 4

4. It is a general practice of the Fire Services Communications Centre (“FSCC”) to inform the Water Supplies Department (“WSD”) of the occurrence of a fire as soon as a No. 3 Alarm is raised. The No. 3 Alarm Fire indicates a significantly larger and more extensive fire and potentially requires a greater demand for water in firefighting operations. WSD is made aware for contingency purposes. Normally, the WSD staff would respond to the scene. In the event that water supply from the street fire hydrants is found inadequate, prompt on-site assistance could be provided by the WSD staff.
5. In line with the general practice, WSD was informed of the fire incident at Wang Fuk Court at 1519 hours on 26 November 2025 after the fire was upgraded to a No. 3 Alarm at 1502 hours on the same day. The WSD duty staff was then deployed to the scene.

6. In order to ensure a sufficient water supply from WSD street fire hydrants for firefighting purposes, FSD personnel requested the WSD duty staff at scene to increase the water supply. The WSD duty staff opened all relevant government water main valves at approximately 1600 hours on the same day. Subsequently, the WSD duty staff conducted inspections of the WSD street hydrants at the scene and recorded a continuous water supply with pressure of 7-7.5 bar during the active firefighting and rescue operation. As could be observed, the water pressure of 7-7.5 bar achieved after the opening of the valves was significantly beyond FSD's minimum requirement of 1.7 bar (by 3.1-3.4 times). This enhanced setting enabled a consistent and stable supply of water from the street fire hydrants near Wang Fuk Court, and hence the availability of water from those street hydrants did not pose a limitation on FSD's firefighting efforts.
7. Instead of water supply from street fire hydrants, the limiting factors in firefighting efforts were those difficulties and challenges elaborated in Part B of my 1st Witness Statement.

Question 3 of Request 4

8. The liquefied petroleum gas ("LPG") supply to Wang Fuk Court was cut off by Sinopec's site operators on their own initiative at around 1600 hours on 26 November 2025. FSD confirmed with Sinopec at 1830 hours on 26 November 2025 via FSCC that the LPG supply to Wang Fuk Court was completely cut off.
9. FSD did not request CLP Power Hong Kong Limited ("CLP") to disconnect the electricity supply to Wang Fuk Court amid firefighting and rescue operations. In a way, maintaining the electricity supply ensured that power remained available to individual units and/or in common areas as much as possible for, e.g. illumination, which could facilitate evacuation.

Part B: Material events and decisions at the scene of the fire

Questions 8 to 9 of Request 4

[Question 8]

10. I arrived at the scene at about 1550 hours on 26.11.2025 soon after the fire was upgraded to No. 4 Alarm at 1534 hours. By the time I arrived, the fire had already spread rapidly from Wang Cheong House to 5 other blocks: Wang Tai House, Wang Shing House, Wang Kin House, Wang Sun House and Wang Tao House (see paragraph 15 of the Witness Statement of Ir. Dr. TO Chi-wing). I proceeded to the Mobile Command Unit (“MCU”) ¹ and acknowledged that the Mayday operation for Senior Fireman (Posthumous) 18469 HO Wai-ho (“SF_n HO”) was underway. At 1618 hours, I took on the role of Incident Commander of the No. 4 Alarm Fire from Deputy Chief Fire Officer (New Territories North) (“DCFO(NTN)”) WONG King-man.
11. At about 1613 hours, I directed Divisional Officer (“DO”) LAM Ho-chun to ensure that a roll-call of all crew members at scene was in progress. This action was necessary to ensure that no further crew members were unaccounted for after we had located SF_n HO, who was found unconscious on burning scaffolding outside Wang Tai House. After the roll-call, all members were accounted for.
12. At 1623 hours, I assigned DCFO WONG King-man, who possessed a higher level of commanding authority, to take over the role of Rescue Officer and take charge of the overall Search and Rescue (“SAR”) operations.

¹ The MCU is a specialised fire appliance that serves as fire incident field command centre during major fire/incidents.

13. Upon the arrival of the Compartment Fire Specialists³ at 1628 hours, I deployed them to assist in the firefighting operation at Wang Cheong House, as the firefighting operation there was particularly challenging and more firefighting and rescue efforts were necessary.
14. In view of the fire development and situation, I, as instructed by Deputy Director (Operations) CHAN Derek Armstrong (“DD(Ops)”) on-site, requested the attendance of additional Senior Officers (i.e. Senior Divisional Officer (“SDO”) or DO), via FS personnel on duty at the MCU, for maintaining effective command and control at the scene. Each affected building was assigned with a designated Senior Officer for directing firefighting and, where necessary, simultaneously overseeing SAR operations. This arrangement enhanced overall responsiveness and ensured that specific operational tactics could be deployed by senior and experienced commanders in view of the actual conditions encountered in different buildings.
15. Upon arrival of the summoned Senior Officers from various divisions / units to the scene, I assigned the following Senior Officers to lead and oversee the firefighting operations at the designated buildings during the time I was acting as the Incident Commander.
 - Wang Shing House: SDO WONG Wang-leong
 - Wang Cheong House: DO CHENG Chun-kit
 - Wang Tai House: SDO LAI Wai-hei

³ The Compartment Fire Specialists are qualified Compartment Fire Behaviour Training instructors. They provide strategical advice and tactical support to Incident Commanders, as well as offering immediate assistance to frontline personnel by participating in actual firefighting operations. The specialists respond to building fire of No. 3 Alarm, fire incidents involving premises with special risks, or upon request by the Incident Commander.

- Wang Kin House: DO LAM Ho-chun
- Wang Sun House: DO LAI King-leung (Acting)
- Wang Tao House: DO WONG Chun-on
- Wang Yan House: SDO HO Chun-pong

16. Also, I assigned DO CHOW Chin-choi to take precautionary interventions against possible fire spread to Wang Chi House.
17. To obtain additional resources for firefighting operations, I requested the attendance of four additional fire appliances and one turntable ladder at 1644 hours. I also requested the attendance of one additional Breathing Apparatus (“BA”) Pod⁴ at 1724 hours for providing additional BA cylinders and BA sets to facilitate effective BA operation.
18. In the face of the development of fire and the continued increase of assistance calls, DD(Ops) upgraded the fire to No. 5 Alarm at 1822 hours and assumed overall command.

[Question 9(a)]

19. The progress of FSD’s firefighting containment efforts concerning each block and floor within Wang Fuk Court is provided in FSD(4)/G(III)/5. [FSD(4)/G(III)/5]

[Question 9(b)]

20. FSD’s position regarding resource deployment is that adequate staffing resources and appliances were in place during the incident. As stated in paragraphs 42 to 43 of my 1st Witness Statement, by 1822 hours, a total of 718 personnel along with 171 fire services appliances were deployed, and by 2230 hours, deployment had

⁴ The BA Pod is a fire appliance that carries breathing apparatus, reserve breathing apparatus cylinders and detection equipment. It serves to provide toxic and combustible gas detection equipment and breathing apparatus at incidents.

increased to 989 personnel and 221 appliances.

21. There are no internal protocols or external considerations preventing the Incident Commander and any sector officers, at various points, from requesting additional resources as the situation warrants. The available resources were not limited to the New Territories North Command, but extended to the entire Service. In fact, owing to spatial constraints within and outside the building, including limited staircase and corridor space, as well as the fact that most of the emergency vehicular access (“EVA”) serving Wang Fuk Court were being covered by large amounts of burning bamboo sticks and fallen debris, there was a practical limit to the quantity of personnel and appliances that could be effectively and safely deployed at any one time. Notwithstanding that the EVA became inaccessible for effective deployment of the turntable ladders, turntable ladders were deployed at available strategic positions for external firefighting around Wang Fuk Court.

[Question 9(c)]

22. The Incident Commander, or his superior(s), may consider upgrading the fire alarm for the purposes of requesting additional resources in accordance with the predetermined scale and requiring an officer of higher rank to take over the role of Incident Commander.
23. In the face of the development of fire and the continued increase of assistance calls, DD(Ops) on-site upgraded the fire to No. 5 Alarm at 1822 hours and assumed overall command. By that time, the fire had already spread to the last of the 7 blocks that were affected, Wang Yan House (see paragraph 15 of the Witness Statement of Ir. Dr. TO Chi-wing).

24. During the entire duration of the No. 4 Alarm Fire, the Incident Commander and officers could directly call for extra resources as per the specific needs of the firefighting and SAR operations. Resources for reinforcement remained readily available across the entire Service, despite the increasing urgency of the situation. Indeed, as mentioned in paragraph 42 of my 1st Witness Statement, by the time the fire was upgraded to No.5 Alarm, the cumulative manpower deployed had already reached about 6.5 times of the Pre-determined Attendance for a No. 5 Alarm Fire.
25. Nevertheless, as the fire remained fierce and the number of assistance calls was increasing at the material time, DD(Ops) and I anticipated that more high-level commanding and controlling efforts as well as resources would be required. It was for this reason that DD(Ops) assumed overall command by upgrading the fire to No. 5 Alarm with me taking up the role of his Aide. Later, another two directorate officers, viz the Assistant Director (New Territories South) and DCFO (Fire Safety), were deployed to the scene for overseeing operational safety and facilitating SAR operations respectively. More directorate officers were deployed under DD(Ops)'s overall command.
26. A "Disaster" Alarm will be raised only if the entire resources of FSD are engaged for a protracted period, and possibly requiring the assistance of the garrison. The development of the fire and resources engaged had yet to reach this level.

[Question 9(d)]

27. Please refer to FSD(4)/G(III)/11. for a site map showing the allocation and placement of fire hoses, jets and turntable ladders at material points during the fire and the considerations taken into account. [FSD(4)/G(III)/11]

[Question 9(e)]

28. Resources deployment at the scene was dynamic. Teams from various fire appliances deployed across the entire Service were dispatched to conduct firefighting and SAR operations among different buildings. Normally, the crew members of a fire appliance will conduct the designated operational mission(s) collectively, forming at least two BA teams, each consisting of two members. The crew members of fire appliances deployed to different buildings will be utilised flexibly by the sector officers for firefighting, SAR, or a combination of both, depending on the specific circumstances of each building at any one point. The table below outlines the number of fire appliances that had ever been deployed to the affected buildings for firefighting and SAR operations on 26 November 2025. The teams of each appliance could have been assigned tasks in different buildings throughout the day.

| Blocks | No. of Fire Appliances Ever Deployed on 26.11.2025 |
|-------------------|---|
| Wang Shing House | About 16 |
| Wang Cheong House | About 54 |
| Wang Tai House | About 50 |
| Wang Kin House | About 13 |
| Wang Sun House | About 10 |
| Wang Tao House | About 14 |
| Wang Yan House | About 9 |

[Question 9(f)]

29. After the fire was raised to No. 3 Alarm, two MCUs were deployed to the scene. The first arriving MCU served as the Incident Command Post where the Incident Commander performed the command functions. The second MCU was deployed to serve as the Command Support/Inter-departmental Command Post, where FSD could coordinate with other government departments in

fighting the fire. For instance, FSD personnel and WSD duty staff collaborated to increase water supply at the scene, exchanging information at the Incident Command Post regarding the status of WSD street fire hydrants during firefighting and rescue operations. The MCUs at the scene functioned as vital communication links between FSCC and the fire ground, serving as a central hub for information and support coordination.

[Question 9(g)]

30. The Fire Hydrant/Hose Reel (“**FH/HR**”) system in Wang Fuk Court was designed to provide water coverage to the entire building from the ground level to the topmost floor. It comprises various components including the (i) FS inlets located on the ground floor which serve to connect the FH/HR system to fire appliances, (ii) FS pumps also located on the ground floor which serve to increase pressure of water supply, and (iii) hydrant outlets and hose reel located on the staircase and the common corridors respectively which allow water discharge to every part of the building. [FSD/D(III)/4]
31. On 26.11.2025, the FH/HR systems in the affected buildings were under repair and the associated pumps were non-functional during the fire. As such, water fed from our pumping appliances through FS inlets on the ground floor could not be effectively boosted up by the FH/HR systems to the upper floors (i.e. around 20-23/F upwards) for very effective firefighting.⁵ Relying solely on the power of our pumping appliances might not be able to maintain

⁵ While the water pressure of street fire hydrants was increased by WSD, it only ensures sufficient water supply for our pumping appliances. However, in order for the water from those appliances to effectively reach the outlets of the Fire Hydrant/Hose Reel System on upper floors of the buildings, along with adequate pressure for firefighting, the FS pumps in the buildings need to be operational but they were not at the time.

sufficient water jet pressure for firefighting on upper floors. To address the issue, numerous portable pumps⁶ were available at the scene for water relay to the upper floors as necessary. Additional efforts were required by firefighters to carry the portable pumps upstairs and advance floor by floor via the staircases, sometimes amid heat and smoke, from the ground level to establish a safe bridgehead for its placement and operation. Bringing the compact portable pump (about 80 kg) to the upper floors, in addition to our basic personal protective equipment (about 23 kg), requires considerable physical effort from our frontline crews.

[Question 9(h)]

32. The fire ground communication was found generally effective. Separate fire ground radiotelephone (“R/T”) channels were allocated to the affected buildings. Vehicle/Portable repeaters available at the scene were used for enhancing long-distance radio communication if necessary. Members of the Communications Support Team⁷ maintained effective radio communication and battery checks during the firefighting and SAR operations.
33. However, it cannot be completely ruled out that under certain extreme circumstances, firefighters encountered inevitable challenges in using handheld radios while wearing BA with full-face masks (such as muffled speech while speaking “through” the mask). To enable communication between the BA wearers and

⁶ To guarantee that water relaying support is readily available, every FSD Major Pump, which serves as the primary pumping appliance in FSD, is equipped with a Compact Portable Pump as part of its standard stowage. A compact portable pump functions as a relay in high-rise building firefighting by acting as an intermediate booster pump to boost water supply to upper floors from lower floors via fire hydrant outlets in the buildings.

⁷ The Communications Support Team was established in June 2011 to enhance operation efficiency and facilitate radio communications efficiency at the fire scene.

other crew members, BA used in Wang Fuk Court incident was equipped with a VoiceCOM⁸. Despite its voice amplifying ability, the VoiceCOM has its limitations, as it does not provide a direct link to our handheld radio. During the incident, we observed instances where VoiceCOM messages transmitted via handheld radio lacked clarity, particularly under noisy environment or while speaking amidst hurried breath, even though successful radio connections had been established. The communication can become more challenging when the receiver is also wearing BA with full-face mask, as the receiver's ears are covered by a protective hood.

34. FSD has already addressed this communication issue through the implementation of the new Interspiro Incurve-E BA system with effect from 19 January 2026, which features a Spirocom system mounted onto each full-face mask (with a microphone inserted into the speech cone and a flexible speaker arm set the desired speaker position against the ear). The Spirocom system is directly connected to the handheld radio of each firefighter to facilitate effective communication.

Part C: Search, rescue and evacuation

[Question 10(d)]

35. General enquiries were made to the initial attending officers about the evacuation situation during the early stage of the fire. Based on their visual observation at the time, over 250 residents from different buildings were visually estimated to have self-evacuated to the ground floor. This figure of 250 is thus a sum of all the best estimates that the initial attending officers were able to make while they were also carrying out their own operational duties during the initial stage of the fire against the urgent and everchanging situation at the time.

⁸ The VoiceCOM can increase the voice volume of the wearer by 2 times.

36. I confirm that the contents of this Witness Statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 19th day of February 2026.



TANG Wing-wah
Assistant Director
(New Territories North)
Fire Services Department