

**Independent Committee in relation to the
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

WITNESS STATEMENT OF

LAM WING-SZE, EMMA

I, LAM Wing-sze, Emma, Superintendent of Police, Hong Kong Police Force, of the New Territories North Regional Headquarters, No. 6 On Po Lane, Tai Po, New Territories, Hong Kong do say as follows:-

1. I am the Superintendent (“**SP**”), Operations, New Territories North (“**NTN**”) (“**OPS NTN**”), Hong Kong Police Force (“**Force**”) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. I have joined the Force for 26 years since about 1999 and was promoted to the present rank on 5 October 2015. I have been acting as the Senior Superintendent (“**SSP**”) OPS NTN since November 2025. My main responsibilities include the coordination and implementation of regional policy in NTN in relation to operational matters. In case of a Major Incident (“**MI**”) in my current capacity, I would assist my Regional Commander in the Incident Command Centre (“**ICC**”) to establish and assume direct command of the ICC.
2. I make this Witness Statement pursuant to the request of the Independent Committee (“**Committee**”) in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po as set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo, Solicitors for the Committee, to the Department of Justice dated 19 January 2026 (“**19 January Letter**”) in which specific questions

were raised in paragraphs 1 to 19 (“**Questions**”). Save where otherwise appears, the facts deposed hereto are within my personal knowledge or are derived from office files and records and sources to which I have access and which are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

3. In this Witness Statement, I shall address Question 19, a., i. and 19, b. of the 19 January Letter, and explain the operation of the ICC (situated at the Higher Command (“**HICOM**”)) throughout the Wang Fuk Court fire incident (“**Incident**”). Other Questions which are within the Force’s purview will be addressed in the witness statements of other relevant officers of the Force to the Committee.

4. This Witness Statement is divided into the following parts:-
 - (1) Part A describes the general duties and composition of the ICC at the HICOM; and
 - (2) Part B sets out the chronology of how and when police officers were deployed to Wang Fuk Court and the deployment of police officers attending the scene between 1450 and 1600 hours on 26 November 2025 in answer to Question 19, a., i. and 19, b.

Part A – General Duties and Composition of the ICC at the HICOM

5. As soon as an emergency or disaster is declared as a MI by the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Operations, Mr David Jordan (“**ACP OPS**”), the ICC situated at the HICOM would be activated.

6. The ICC is accommodated at the HICOM, at room 118A, 11th Floor, NTN, Regional Police Headquarters, No. 6, On Po Lane, Tai Po.
7. In general, during significant operations or events in the NTN region, the HICOM can be activated for overseeing the operation or event and monitoring its progress. When a MI is declared, the HICOM will become the ICC situated at the HICOM location.
8. The functions of the ICC are to support the Forward Control Point (“FCP”), oversee coordination and provide all available resources to support the effectiveness and management of the incident concerned, and seek provision of Police and non-Police resources through the Headquarters Command and Control Centre (“HQCCC”).
9. For the ICC to perform the stated functions, the manpower deployed to the ICC during a particular shift will be assigned to two teams. Each team is commanded by an ICC Coordinator assisted by an Inspectorate officer. The manpower of each team will be adjusted to cope with the workload as the incident develops.
10. The manpower of the ICC is mainly drawn from OPS NTN units and other units of the Regional Headquarters, with a pool of around 30 police officers from the units to be maintained at all times.
11. For the police officers, a one-day induction training will be provided to the untrained officers and a one-day refresher training will be arranged for the trained officers by OPS NTN.

12. For the Incident, the ICC, for each 12-hour shift, maintained a composition of 11 officers, including one SSP or SP, one Chief Inspector of Police (Second-in-command), two Inspectors of Police (Operations and Administration), two Sergeants (Logistics and Support), three Police Constables (Log-keeper, Radio officer and Messenger), one Traffic Sergeant as Liaison Officer and one Police Communications Officer (“PCO”).

Command Structure

13. In general, the SSP of OPS NTN assists the Regional Commander to command the ICC, and the SP of OPS NTN assumes the role of ICC Coordinator.
14. As I was acting up in the capacity of SSP OPS NTN at the time of the Incident, I took up both roles starting from its first day of activation (26 November 2025) and was assisted by the Chief Inspector of Police of OPS NTN, WONG Sze-pan, covering the first shift from 1540 hours on 26 November 2025 to 0700 hours on 27 November 2025.

Operation Outline for the Incident

15. The ICC operated for the Incident between 26 November 2025 and 12 December 2025, on two shifts daily.

The Specific Duty of the ICC Team

16. The ICC team was to assist me and the Second-in-command in

coordinating resources, collating data and information, liaising with the FCP, the HQCCC, and the Emergency Monitoring and Support Centre (“EMSC”) at the Security Bureau, other Government departments and police units, and arranging logistics and support for the operation.

Part B – Chronology of How and When Police Officers were Deployed to Wang Fuk Court and the Deployment of Police Officers Attending the Scene between 1450 and 1600 hours on 26 November 2025

17. At 1520 hours on 26 November 2025, I was informed by the Duty Controller, Superintendent of Police, Acting, of Team 3 Regional Command and Control Centre (“SP RCCC T3 NT”), LI King-yan, that there was a fire at Wang Fuk Court. I entered into the HICOM of OPS NTN, and monitored its progress.
18. At 1525 hours, one platoon of the Police Tactical Unit (“PTU”) NTN originally tasked for patrol duties in Tai Po district was redeployed to proceed to the FCP for reinforcement.
19. At 1532 hours, I informed Deputy District Commander Tai Po District, SSP LAI Ho-fai, Edmund by phone, and reported to the Regional Commander NTN, Assistant Commissioner of Police LAM Man-han, of the Incident accordingly.
20. At 1534 hours, No.4 alarm fire was acknowledged. The FCP had been activated at 1515 hours. The HICOM was activated at 1540 hours.

21. At 1537 hours, traffic duties were directed to proceed to the scene for traffic management duties, implement road closures and traffic diversions.
22. At 1538 hours, I asked SP RCCC T3 NT to monitor and provide timely update on the incoming “999” calls and injuries in relation to the Incident.
23. At 1600 hours, requests were made for additional resources to be mobilised and redeployed via the HQCCC for the Incident. I attach hereto as **Annex 1** a table showing the names and rank of the police officers who were deployed to and arrived at Wang Fuk Court between 1450 and 1600 hours on 26 November 2025 (listed in the order of reported arrival at the scene).
24. At 1625 hours, I reported to ACP OPS Mr David JORDAN by phone on the situation of the Incident.
25. At 1630 hours, the reinforcement from PTU of other Regions were proceeding to Tai Po, including one platoon from PTU F Company, one Platoon from PTU A Company, one Platoon from PTU Y Company and one Platoon from PTU E company for deployment by the FCP at the scene.
26. At 1651 hours, shelters coordinated by the Home Affairs Department were in operation.
27. At 1711 hours, the units of the Casualty Documentation Teams, Casualty Enquiry Unit (“CEU”) and Regional Crime Unit NTN

were deployed. The Casualty Documentation Teams were responsible for recording and passing the identity information of all casualties and survivors to the CEU, assuming initial responsibility (prior to the arrival of the Disaster Victims Identification Unit) for persons pronounced dead and, if appropriate, the establishment of the Mortuary Collection Point. The CEU was responsible for handling public enquiries relating to casualties arising from the Incident. The Regional Crime Unit NTN was responsible for the incident investigation.


28. At 1712 hours, I directed the provision of logistical support to all ground duties by the Chief Inspector of Police, NTN Regional Headquarters Administration (Temporary).
29. At 1736 hours, the HQCCC informed the HICOM that ACP OPS had declared the Incident as a MI and instructed the activation of the ICC. The HICOM was then activated to become the ICC accordingly.
30. At 1822 hours, No.5 alarm fire was acknowledged. The FCP and ground duties were updated of the same for their traffic management and cordon duties with a view to facilitating the FSD's rescue actions. All available police resources had already been deployed on ground.
31. The deployment since the first police deployment on 26 November 2025 until the completion of the firefighting and rescue operations on 28 November 2025, including the number and rank of police officers deployed, is tabulated at **Annex 2** as attached hereto.

32. During the Incident, the ICC assumed full responsibility for overseeing the Incident and maintaining close communication and coordination with the FCP and the HQCCC with actions recorded in the Incident Logging System (“**ilog**”) and details of casualties recorded in icasualty (“**icasualty**”) respectively. The functions of ilog and icasualty are explained as follows:-

- (1) The ilog is a developed logging system based on the concept of old electronic log. It rolled out in July 2022. The ilog can facilitate operational communication during major events, which enhances the Force’s ability to grasp event development and assists police officers’ assessment and decision making.
- (2) The icasualty is a platform that allows personal information to be recorded at the scene and shared with participating personnel, with the data automatically analysed in real time.

33. I confirm that the contents of this Witness Statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 23 of February 2026.



LAM Wing-sze, Emma