

**Independent Committee in relation to the  
Fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po**

**Witness Statement of KEUNG Sai-ming**

I, KEUNG Sai-ming, of Licensing and Certification Command, Fire Services Department, 5<sup>th</sup> Floor, South Wing, Fire Services Headquarters Building, 1 Hong Chong Road, Tsim Sha Tsui East, Kowloon, do say as follows:-

1. I am the Assistant Director (Licensing and Certification) of the Fire Services Department (“FSD”) of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. I have joined the FSD for 30 year since about 1995 and was promoted to the present rank on 31 March 2024. My main duty is to be responsible for the overall management and strategic direction of the (Licensing and Certification) Command. Key duties include (i) formulating and certifying fire safety standards for new buildings, alterations to existing buildings, and specified licensed premises—including food premises, public entertainment premises, karaoke establishments, child care centres, and non-designated school premises; (ii) overseeing the licensing control regime governing the use, storage, manufacture, and conveyance of dangerous goods, as well as the regulation of timber stores; (iii) administering the statutory framework for the acceptance testing of Fire Service Installations and Equipment (“FSIs”) and the registration of Registered Fire Service Installation Contractors (“RFSICs”); (iv) enforcing legislation pertaining to the abatement of fire hazards, including the issuance of Fire Hazard Abatement Notices (“FHANs”) where necessary; (v) monitoring the condition and annual maintenance compliance of FSIs in existing buildings to

ensure continued operational readiness; (vi) certifying FSIs in new buildings to verify compliance with prevailing fire safety requirements prior to occupation or use.

2. I make this Witness Statement pursuant to the request of the Independent Committee (“**Committee**”) in relation to the fire at Wang Fuk Court in Tai Po as set out in a letter from Messrs. Lo & Lo, Solicitors for the Committee, to the FSD dated 23 December 2025 (“**23 December Letter**”) in which specific questions were raised in paragraphs 2 to 3, 5 to 9, and 12 to 20 (“**Questions**”). Save where otherwise appears, the facts deposed hereto are within my personal knowledge or are derived from office files and records and sources to which I have access and are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief. Save as otherwise specified, this Witness Statement adopts the same abbreviations and nomenclature as in the 23 December Letter.
3. This Witness Statement addresses Questions 13, 14.1.3, 14.4, 19.2 and 19.5 of the 23 December Letter. Other Questions which are within FSD’s purview will be addressed in the witness statements of other relevant officers of FSD to the Committee. I understand that FSD will produce to the Committee a List of Documents (“**LoD**”), a draft of which I have read, indexing all relevant documents in FSD’s possession. In this Witness Statement, I shall refer to these documents by their designation in the LoD (for example, [**FSD/A(I)/1**] means Item 1 in Part A(I) of the LoD) without annexing them hereto for the avoidance of duplication.
4. This Witness Statement is divided into the following parts:-
  - (1) **Part A** provides an explanation and description of the regime and protocol currently in place to ensure fire safety

in residential buildings in Hong Kong in answer to **Question 13**;

- (2) **Part B** identifies pertinent rules, regulations, codes of practice and/or guidelines on fire safety (“**Rules and Regulations**”) during renovation of large-scale building developments such as Wang Fuk Court, specifically on the installation and maintenance of FSI in answer to **Question 14.1.3**;
- (3) **Part C** provides a summary or timeline setting out visits/inspections carried out by FSD at Wang Fuk Court since the commencement of the renovation in July 2024 in answer to **Question 14.4.1**;
- (4) **Part D** provides the notification, inspection and risk management assessment report and the fire-safety plan relevant to the notification of FSI shutdown at Wang Fuk Court in answer to **Question 14.4.3**;
- (5) **Part E** provides the inspection and test reports which reflect the status of the building materials and FSIs in Wang Fuk Court that were tested and/or inspected by FSD and the RFSICs (if any) since July 2024, and our findings thereof, and whether any subsequent follow-up and enforcement actions were taken in answer to **Question 14.4.2**;
- (6) **Part F** provides all test reports on building materials and FSI in Wang Fuk Court that were tested after the fire (which relate to the causes and rapid spread of the fire and challenges in the Operation and Evacuation) in answer to **Question 14.4.4**;
- (7) **Part G** provides recommendations to enable timely warnings to be given to residents in cases of fire alarm failure in answer to **Question 19.2**; and
- (8) **Part H** explains the reporting procedures and obligations on

contractors to inform FSD of the temporary suspensions of the fire hydrant, hose reel, and fire alarm systems during the renovation of Wang Fuk Court in answer to **Question 19.5**.

**Part A - Regime and protocol currently in place to ensure fire safety in residential buildings in Hong Kong**

5. Regulatory Regimes in relation to Building Fire Safety

5.1 To achieve the fire safety objective, there shall be active and passive fire safety provisions within every building. I believe that the part of **Question 13** concerning the definition and division of regulatory authorities will be covered by the witness statement provided by Assistant Director (Fire Safety) YUNG Kam-hung, Michael. As such, the following will focus on the part of **Question 13** concerning the regulatory regime that is governing active fire safety provisions.

5.2 FSIs are a cornerstone of the fire safety regime for residential buildings in Hong Kong.<sup>1</sup> The regulatory control of FSIs is currently established by statute and designed to ensure that all FSIs remain in efficient working order at all times. The FSD administers a regulatory framework that clearly delineates responsibilities amongst the regulator, accredited contractors, and building owners or their agents.

5.3 Regulatory Regime for FSIs

5.3.1 According to Section 16(1)(b) of the Buildings Ordinance [FSD/A(I)/5] (“**Cap. 123**”), buildings must be provided with the minimum

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<sup>1</sup> See paragraph 12.2 for a list of the major FSIs

FSIs required for their intended use. In addition, under Section 21(6)(d) of Cap. 123, the Buildings Department (“**BD**”) will not issue an occupation permit unless the Director of Fire Services (“**D of FS**”) certifies that those required FSIs shown on the vetted building plans have been properly installed and are up to the required standard. Meanwhile, the Fire Service (Installation Contractors) Regulations (“**Cap. 95A**”) and the Fire Service (Installations and Equipment) Regulations (“**Cap. 95B**”) made under Sections 25(1)(g) and 25(1)(h) of the Fire Services Ordinance (“**Cap. 95**”) empower the D of FS to regulate the conduct of RFSICs and the control of the installation, repair, maintenance and inspection of FSIs. Under Regulation 8 of Cap. 95B, the owner (which includes the occupier) of FSIs has a legal responsibility to keep the FSIs in efficient working order at all times.

[FSD/A(I)/1]

[FSD/A(I)/3]

#### 5.4 Regulatory Regime for RFSICs

- 5.4.1 To start, Regulations 6 and 7 of Cap. 95B stipulate that only an RFSIC shall install, maintain, inspect, or repair any FSIs that is required by or pursuant to law to be installed. Under the classification system stipulated in Regulation 4 of Cap. 95A, three classes of RFSICs are designated: Class 1: for any FSIs (other than portable equipment) which contains an electrical circuit or other apparatus for the detection and warning, by alarm or otherwise, of smoke or fire; Class 2: for any FSIs (other than portable equipment) which contains pipes and fittings designed or adapted to carry water or some other fire extinguishing medium; or any type of electrical apparatus other than those specified in Class 1; and Class 3:

[FSD/A(I)/3]

[FSD/A(I)/2]

[FSD/G(I)/18]

for any portable equipment. During the registration process, applicants and their proposed qualified persons<sup>2</sup> must produce supporting documents for verification, participate in an interview, and undergo a workshop inspection where they must demonstrate the use of required equipment.

- 5.4.2 The primary monitoring mechanism for contractor performance is the mandatory "*Certificate of Fire Service Installations and Equipment*" ("**FS251**"). As required under Regulation 9(1) of Cap. 95B, whenever an RFSIC installs, maintains, repairs, or inspects any FSIs in any premises, he must issue this certificate to the instructing person within 14 days of completion and forward a copy to the D of FS. As required under Regulation 9(2) of Cap. 95B, the certificate is required to state the address of the premises in which the work was carried out, a description of the FSIs concerned, the date of the completion of the work, the nature of the work carried out, and whether or not the FSI is in efficient working order. An RFSIC who fails to issue the certificate as required or signs or issues a certificate which is false or misleading in any material particular commits an offence: Regulation 9(2A), 9(3)(a) & 9(3)(b) of Cap. 95B. Separately, RFSICs shall comply with the relevant Codes of [FSD/A(I)/3]

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<sup>2</sup> In accordance with Regulation 4 of Cap. 95A, for class 1 RFSICs, qualified person shall (i) hold a degree in electrical engineering satisfying the examination requirements (Parts I and II) of the Council of Engineering Institutions for corporate membership of the Institution of Electrical Engineers and (ii) be the manufacturer or designer of an electrical circuit or other apparatus for the detection by alarm or otherwise of smoke or fire or is an authorized agent for the above type of manufacturer. For class 2 RFSICs, qualified person shall (i) hold a Grade I plumber's licence issued under the Waterworks Ordinance (Cap. 102) and (ii) hold a diploma from the Hong Kong Polytechnic University or a Technical Institute or a higher certificate in electrical engineering or a qualification recognized as equivalent to such a diploma or certificate by the D of FS.

Practice as required under Regulation 10 of Cap.95B. The performance of RFSICs is monitored by the FSD through audit check mechanism which includes (i) document review of FS251 submitted by RFSICs to ensure compliance with statutory requirement; (ii) verification inspection to verify accuracy of the FS251; and (iii) functional test of FSI to ensure its efficient working order. The FSD conducts proactive audit checks on a percentage of submitted FS251. For certificates indicating no defects, the local fire stations also conduct a significant number of on-site verification inspections annually. Throughout the review, inspection or functional test process, any defects or discrepancies identified will be followed up. In doing so, we may also uncover instances of non-compliance or misconduct by RFSICs.

- 5.4.3 For RFSICs who violate regulations, the FSD will initiate investigations, prosecute the RFSICs concerned, and refer matters to the Registered Fire Service Installation Contractors Disciplinary Board (“**Disciplinary Board**”) for inquiry, with the maximum punishment of being removed from the register. The FSD mainly prosecutes RFSICs in breach of provisions such as Regulation 9(1) of Cap.95B for failing to issue the certificate, Regulation 9(2A) for a person signing a false or misleading certificate, and Regulation 9(3)(b) for a contractor issuing or forwarding a false or misleading certificate. As stipulated in Regulation 10(1), the D of FS may refer a matter to the Disciplinary Board if a contractor has been convicted of an offence or has been guilty of improper conduct or negligence rendering them unfit to be on the register. The conviction records of the past

[FSD/G(I)/19]  
para. 2.1  
pp. 1-3

[FSD/A(I)/3]

7 years of disciplinary hearings will be made known to public on FSD's website.

- 5.4.4 Furthermore, the FSD operates a “Demerit Points System” for RFSICs. Under this system, inspection levels are determined based on the accumulation of points. RFSICs prosecuted for violating ordinances or punished by the Disciplinary Board are assigned demerit points, as is a finding of non-compliance during an on-site inspection. RFSICs with higher accumulated points are subject to more on-site inspections and proactive audit functional tests. Specifically, for an RFSIC with a higher points balance, a greater number of their FS251 are randomly selected for inspection. [FSD/G(I)/21]

## 5.5 Regulatory Regime of FSI Owners and Property Management

- 5.5.1 The entire FSI regulatory regime involves responsibilities from multiple parties, including the FSD as the regulator, the RFSICs as the party responsible for execution, and the owners and/or Owners' Corporation as the owners of FSIs with the ultimate responsibility to ensure that FSIs are in efficient working order at all times. According to Regulation 8 of Cap. 95B, the owner must have such installations or equipment inspected by an RFSIC at least once every 12 months. The FSD monitors this responsibility by checking the status of building FSIs via (i) audits, such as vetting copies of FS251s submitted to the FSD and functional tests; and (ii) visits/inspections, such as handling complaints and defective FSIs. [FSD/A(I)/3]

5.5.2 The FSD will ascertain whether an annual inspection has been conducted. Where no FS251 has been received, it is a prima facie case of non-compliance by the owners<sup>3</sup>, and the FSD will take necessary enforcement action. For any FSIs found to be defective, the FSD will take appropriate actions against the owners concerned.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
pp. 7-9 (A.S.  
No. 148/7-9)

5.5.3 In general, the Deed of Mutual Covenant of a building stipulates FSIs in common areas as common parts, and the Owners' Corporation normally hands over day-to-day management of those FSIs to a Property Management Company ("PMC"). The Owners' Corporation has a legal responsibility to ensure that FSIs are operating efficiently. As for the PMC, according to the Property Management Services Ordinance ("Cap. 626") and its Code of Conduct, it has a responsibility to assist the Owners and its Corporation in fulfilling these duties. The Code of Conduct for Handling Fire Safety Work includes provisions that the PMC must (a) clearly stipulate in the contract that the RFSIC has to comply with FSD requirements and (b) monitor the progress of the RFSIC's work including but not limited to, following up timely with the RFSIC on required rectifications and keeping relevant documents; following up timely with the RFSIC that it has to notify the D of FS of any FSI shutdowns; and assisting FSD officers during visits, inspections or investigations.

[FSD/A(I)/9]

[FSD/G(III)/5]  
p. 2

[FSD/G(III)/5]  
pp. 8-9

5.6 From time to time, FSIs may occasionally develop defects or require temporary shutdowns for carrying out maintenance/ inspection/

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<sup>3</sup> Regulation 8(1) of Cap. 95B.

[FSD/A(I)/3]

modification/ repair by RFSICs. To ensure that such occasions are managed in a consistent, safe and compliant manner, the FSD had established procedural frameworks, of which those related to FSI shutdowns and defects will be elaborated in the latter parts of my statement.

**Part B – Rules and Regulations during renovation of large-scale building developments such as Wang Fuk Court, specifically on the installation and maintenance of FSI**

6. Roles of different Departments during Building Renovation

6.1 Building renovation encompasses a wide range of works, including structural alterations, façade modifications, internal layout reconfigurations, and upgrading of building services. It is important to clarify that the FSD does not have a regulatory role in the general planning, approval, or supervision of building renovation works, except where such works involve alterations to building’s approved plan. These responsibilities fall under the purview of other government departments and agencies, including the BD as the principal authority for building safety and compliance with the Buildings Ordinance; the Urban Renewal Authority (“URA”) in respect of urban redevelopment projects; the Independent Checking Unit of Housing Bureau (“ICU”) in respect of properties developed by the Hong Kong Housing Authority; and the Labour Department (“LD”) concerning construction site safety.

Mechanism of handling FSI Shutdown

6.2 Normally, building renovation projects in large-scale building developments do **NOT** necessarily require the shutdown of FSI and

would not affect functionality of FSI of the building, thus FSD would not require the owner to provide additional FSI provision. **No matter whether the building is undergoing renovation or not,** should the FSI be required to be shut down for maintenance or repair, a systematic approach should be adopted in carrying out the works, the affected FSI should be shut down by sections and be resumed normal as soon as practicable. In case the work is expected to be carried out overnight or persist for more than 24 hours and if the defect in the FSI may, in the event of fire, put the entire building in jeopardy, in accordance with FSD Circular Letter No. 1/2021 - Shutdown of Fire Service Installations for Maintenance, Inspection, Modification or Repair, a set of procedures for handling shutdown of FSIs must be observed by RFSIC when any of major FSIs need to be shut down for maintenance, inspection, modification, or repair.

[FSD/A(III)/1]  
p. 3, sub-para.  
(E)

- 6.3 Once the shutdown details including the location(s) / part(s) requiring works and the duration of the shutdown have been confirmed, the RFSIC shall submit a FSI Shutdown Notice (“SDN”) to the FSD within 24 hours. Upon receiving the notification, personnel from the local fire station will visit the premises within 24 hours to conduct a risk assessment. The objectives are twofold: (i) to assess the risk from an operational perspective; and (ii) to assess the scale and type of additional fire safety measures to be taken by FSI owner(s) during the shutdown period.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4.1, p. 7  
(A.S. No. 148/7)

- 6.4 During risk assessments by the operational officers, their professional judgment focuses on:
- (a) Building type;
  - (b) Configuration of the building, such as floor area, height, number of floors or basements, number of staircases, compartmentation, etc.;

- (c) Type of occupancies being affected, e.g., Residential Care Home for the Elderly / Persons with Disabilities / Child Care Centres / Places of Public Entertainment (e.g., Cinemas, Theatres, Theme Parks, etc., where large licensed areas and a large number of participants are concerned) / Hotels / Guesthouse Accommodations / Dangerous Goods Stores, etc.;
- (d) Availability of water supply for firefighting purposes (e.g., nearby street fire hydrants and emergency vehicle access);
- (e) State of housekeeping; and
- (f) Information provided by RFSICs about the types of FSIs that are inoperative or shut down.

#### 6.5 Such assessments would:

- 6.5.1 Allow operational members to be more aware of the types of FSIs that are inoperative or shut down;
- 6.5.2 Facilitate operational preparedness and resources deployment, such as determining whether additional fire appliances are needed and establishing contingency plans if necessary; and
- 6.5.3 Request the FSI owners to take additional fire safety measures (e.g., provide portable fire extinguishers and arrange regular fire patrols of the affected areas) to mitigate the risk.

#### 6.6 Based on the risk assessment results, the FSD will issue an Advisory Letter to the FSI owner(s), urging them to complete repairs as early as possible and requiring them to notify the occupants of the FSI failures. The Advisory letter may also require the owner(s) to adopt additional fire safety measures within 72 hours in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as providing sufficient portable fire

extinguishers or enhancing patrols (e.g. by implementing 24-hour manned fire patrols). Re-inspection would be conducted by the frontline officers of the respective local fire station 72 hours after the issuance of the Advisory Letter to check whether the standby means have been properly provided. Further enforcement actions may be taken by the FSD for non-provision of the standby means. The FSD will monitor the progress of the repair works of FSIs.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4.8, p. 8  
(A.S. No. 148/8)

- 6.7 Further visits/inspections relating to SDNs will be conducted where an extension notification is not properly submitted, as this may indicate that the originally-engaged RFSIC is no longer carrying out the repair works. This is so unless the repair works have been completed with the submission of valid FS251. In addition, where a notification of extension concerns defects that differ from the original one, a re-visit/re-inspection would ordinarily be arranged for the purpose of risk assessment.
- 6.8 Where, however, the extension notification pertained to the same defect as previously assessed, no further visit/inspection or duplicated risk assessment would be required. The initial risk assessment had already been completed, the necessary mitigation measures had been implemented, and the relevant stakeholders—including residents—had been informed of the shutdown. As the FSIs have already been shut down and the RFSIC should have commenced the required maintenance or repair works, the situation is not expected to deteriorate further during the extended shutdown period. In these circumstances, an additional visits/inspection would not provide further risk-related value, and it remains the responsibility of the RFSIC to report completion once the rectification works have been finished.

**Part C - Summary or timeline setting out visits/inspections carried out by FSD at Wang Fuk Court since the commencement of the renovation in July 2024**

7. Timeline of Visits, Inspections and Enforcement by FSD

- 7.1 In general, visits/inspections to a domestic estate like Wang Fuk Court by various units of the FSD are generally initiated from 3 [FSD/G(I)/17] aspects, namely fire hazard complaints, FSI related visits/inspections and proactive visits by local fire stations.

Inspection arising from Fire Hazard Complaints

- 7.1.1 All fire hazard complaints received by the FSD are governed by the departmental general procedure. When the FSD [FSD/G(I)/5] receives complaints regarding suspected fire hazards such as obstruction to means of escapes (“MoE”) or emergency vehicular access (“EVA”), and locked exits, etc., the case would be followed up by the responsible unit according to its nature and priority. High priority cases are restricted to hazards posing an “imminent danger” to life, such as locked escape routes. For these cases, the department pledges to commence an investigation within 24 hours, often deploying local fire station crews or designated task force to take immediate abatement action. Other than the high priority cases, normal priority investigations encompass the majority of regulatory breaches, such as licensing irregularities that do not pose an immediate catastrophic threat. These cases trigger an inspection by the specified fire protection units within 10 working days.

FSI related Visit/Inspection: Defective FSI reported via FS251 for Annual Inspection by RFSIC [FSD/G(I)/7]

7.1.2 Upon receipt of FS251, the FSD shall check whether there is any report of defects involving major FSI which are crucial to operational efficiency (i.e. major defects). Upon discovery of any major defect(s), the local fire station concerned shall visit the affected buildings where the defective FSI is located within 24 hours and conduct on-site risk assessment for further formulation of contingency plan inclusive of requiring the FSI owner to provide standby means.<sup>4</sup> Re-inspection would be conducted by the fire station 72 hours after the issuance of an Advisory Letter to check whether the standby means (e.g. placing fire extinguishers at affected locations) have been properly provided. Further enforcement actions may be taken by the FSD for non-provision of standby means.

FSI related Visit/Inspection: FSI Shutdown for Works notified by RFSIC [FSD/G(I)/7]

7.1.3 Upon receipt of the SDN submitted by RFSIC, the local fire station shall conduct the same steps as receiving FS251 with defects involving major FSI as mentioned above in para. 7.1.2, i.e. conducting an on-site risk assessment and re-inspection for checking provision of standby means, if any.

Proactive Visit by local Fire Stations [FSD/G(I)/4]

7.1.4 The FSD had launched the Risk-based Building Fire Safety

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<sup>4</sup> For details of the visit for conducting the on-site risk assessment, please refer to paras. 6.3-6.5 above.

Visit Programme since 2018. Under the programme, risk-based building visits are carried out across the territory in order to promote risk-related fire safety education to relevant stakeholders proactively. Besides risk-based building visits, every fire station will also conduct visits such as road trial for emergency vehicular access which also enable operational personnel to familiarize themselves with local layouts, thereby enhancing operational preparedness. These proactive visits enable the frontline personnel to have a better grasp of the conditions of the buildings in their respective districts, so as to lay solid groundwork for firefighting and rescue operations.

7.2 Summary of the Visit/Inspection and Enforcement Statistics of Wang Fuk Court since the Commencement of the Renovation in July 2024 (July 2024 – November 2025)

Type of Visit/ Inspection	Proactive Visits	Complaint Inspections	FSI Visits/ Inspections	Total No.
Total No. of Visit/ Inspection	1	7 (EVA: 2, MoE: 3, Others: 2)	18 (Defective: 6, Shutdown: 12)	26
No. of Direct Prosecution	0	0	0	0
No. of FHAN Issued	0	2 (MoE)	0	2
No. of Warning Letter Issued	N/A	N/A	3	3

Remarks: EVA – Emergency Vehicular Access  
 MoE – Means of Escape  
 FHAN – Fire Hazard Abatement Notice<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> S. 3 of Fire Services (Fire Hazard Abatement) Regulation, Cap. 95F

- 7.2.1 Since renovation works commenced at Wang Fuk Court in July 2024, the FSD has conducted a total of 26 visits/inspections; save as to 1 proactive visit to the EVA of Wang Fuk Court, the other visits/inspections could be categorized into the following 4 types: (i) Defective FSI-related; (ii) FSI Shutdown-related; (iii) Complaints about Obstruction to MoE/EVA; and (iv) Complaints about others.
- 7.2.2 First, regarding defective FSI, 6 visits/inspections were conducted on 28.11.2024, 4.4.2025, 7.4.2025, 12.8.2025, 23.8.2025 and 17.9.2025 respectively upon identification of major defects of major FSIs reported by Victory Fire Engineering Limited (“**Victory**”)<sup>6</sup> via FS251s after the Annual Inspection. This resulted in the issuance of Advisory Letters and/or Warning Letters by the FSD to require provision of standby means and/or to expedite rectification works.
- 7.2.3 Second, regarding the fire hydrant/hose reel (“**FH/HR**”) system shutdown notified by China Status Development and Engineering Company Limited (“**China Status Development**”)<sup>7</sup>, 12 visits/inspections were conducted between April 2025 to September 2025. These visits/inspections included on-site risk assessments, Advisory Letter issuances and compliance checks.

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<sup>6</sup> *Victory was the RFSIC appointed by the property management company of Wang Fuk Court, ISS EastPoint Properties Limited, to carry out an annual inspection of the FSIs of all 8 blocks of Wang Fuk Court in March 2025.*

<sup>7</sup> *China Status Development was the RFSIC that was appointed by the Incorporated Owners of Wang Fuk Court and have submitted SDNs for FH/HR system from April to September 2025.*

- 7.2.4 Third, with respect to complaints about obstruction to MoE/EVA, 5 inspections were conducted on 2.9.2024 (2 inspections on the same date), 13.9.2024, 23.12.2024 and 19.11.2025. 2 FHANs were issued on 19.11.2025 and were found complied with at scene, while other complaints were found not substantiated.
- 7.2.5 Finally, 2 inspections were conducted on 25.9.2024 and 17.11.2024 respectively for a public complaint received via 1823 concerning (i) the storage and potential use of large quantity of polystyrene boards and (ii) installation of solar panels on the roof floor, respectively. No breaches of the Fire Services Ordinance (Cap. 95) and/ or Regulations were found. Given that the former case had already been referred by 1823 to the ICU at the same time as the ICU was responsible for building renovation for Home Ownership Scheme, no further referral was made by the case officer.<sup>8</sup> The latter case was further referred by the FSD to the ICU for follow-up actions.

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<sup>8</sup> More information about the inspection and follow-up action concerning the former case will be covered by the witness statement provided by Assistant Director (Fire Safety) YUNG Kam-hung, Michael in reply to Question 19.8.2.

7.3 Summary of all Other Visit/Inspection and Enforcement Statistics of Wang Fuk Court (scope limited to January 2021 – June 2024 provided for reference)

<b>Type of Visit/ Inspection</b>	<b>Proactive Visits</b>	<b>Complaint Inspections</b>	<b>FSI Visits/ Inspections</b>	<b>Total No.</b>
Total No. of Visit/ Inspection	12	8 (EVA: 2, MoE: 4, MoE + SSD: 2)	4 (Defective: 1, Shutdown: 3)	24
No. of Direct Prosecution	0	0	0	0
No. of FHAN Issued	0	1 (EVA)	0	1
No. of Warning Letter Issued	N/A	N/A	0	0

Remarks: EVA – Emergency Vehicular Access  
 MoE – Means of Escape  
 SSD – Smoke Stop Door  
 FHAN – Fire Hazard Abatement Notice<sup>9</sup>

7.4 As there is a number of visits/inspections conducted by the FSD to Wang Fuk Court throughout the years prior to the commencement of the renovation in July 2024, those conducted from January 2021 to June 2024 as summarized above are considered sufficient to provide a clear overview with regard to FSD’s engagement to the estate for the Committee’s review. For visits/inspections conducted by the FSD from the year of occupation to 2020, there is no evidence associated with the outbreak of fire so far. If the Committee further requests for those records, FSD will gather the information if necessary.

<sup>9</sup> S. 3 of Fire Services (Fire Hazard Abatement) Regulation, Cap. 95F

**Part D - Notification, inspection and risk management assessment report and the fire-safety plan relevant to the notification of FSI shutdown at Wang Fuk Court**

8. General Handling Mechanism on Shutdown Cases

- 8.1 The FSD operates a standardized administrative mechanism for SDNs submitted by RFSICs in respect of major FSI, such as FH/HR systems or Fire Alarm Systems (“FAS”), where shutdowns are expected to be carried out overnight or for more than 24 hours continuously. This process, governed by FSD Circular Letter No. 1/2021, is logged in the Integrated Licensing, Fire Safety and Prosecution System (“LIFIPS”<sup>10</sup>) to allow systematic tracking and coordination amongst the Fire Protection Facilities Supervision Division (“FPFS”), local fire stations and the Fire Services Communications Centre (“FSCC”). [FSD/A(III)/1]
- 8.2 Upon receipt of an SDN, the FSCC acknowledges it, updates the predetermined attendance of any fire incident in the mobilizing system and forwards the SDN to local fire station for review of details, such as location, affected FSI, duration, and reason. The local fire station will create cases in LIFIPS, assigning it to FPFS for ongoing monitoring and itself for immediate action.
- 8.3 Within 24 hours, an officer of local fire station will conduct an on-site risk assessment in the manner mentioned in para. 7.1.3 above. Findings are documented in LIFIPS.

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<sup>10</sup> “LIFIPS” is an integrated electronic platform maintained by the FSD for documenting records in relation to Licensing, Fire Safety and Prosecution.

- 8.4 Based on the assessment, the local fire station will issue an Advisory Letter to the owners or occupiers of the FSIs, urging them to complete repairs as early as possible and requiring them to notify the occupants of the FSI failures. The Advisory letter may require the owners to adopt additional fire safety measures (e.g., deployment of portable extinguishers and/or enhanced patrols) within 72 hours to mitigate the risk imposed on the premises and their occupants during the shutdown period. Compliance is monitored through follow-up inspections.
- 8.5 Meanwhile, FPFS tracks progress in LIFIPS to monitor if the RFSICs had properly submitted extension to the shutdown prior to expiry. The FPFS will monitor the case by contacting the responsible RFSIC to obtain updates on repair progress and to remind them to submit the requisite documentation for extending the shutdown, if necessary.
- 8.6 In case of failure to submit extensions or abandonment of works, FPFS contacts the owners to verify engagement of a new RFSIC. In case no RFSIC is engaged for the repair of defects, further inspection will be conducted followed by issuance of warning letters or enforcement actions including FHAN or prosecution under Cap. 95B. [FSD/A(I)/3]  
regs. 6, 7, 8,  
9(1) & 10
- 8.7 Upon restoration of the subject FSI, the RFSIC submits a SDN (Part 3 resumption of FSI) and FS251, and the relevant case will be closed in LIFIPS accordingly.
- 8.8 At present, FPFS receives approximately 30,000 shutdown and defective cases annually. To ensure timely responses, FPFS

prioritizes those cases that pose higher risks to occupants of the building.

8.9 Reports of Visits/Inspections, Plans and other Follow-ups made by FSD in Response to Notification of FSI Shutdown submitted by China Status Development

8.10 As requested in **Question 14.4.3**, I confirm that starting in about April 2025, the FSD did receive various notifications for FSI shutdown at Wang Fuk Court with the details as follows. Between April and September 2025, China Status Development, acting under the instructions of Prestige Construction & Engineering Limited (“**Prestige**”), the main contractor responsible for building works at Wang Fuk Court under the Operation Building Bright scheme, claimed that they had conducted inspections of the fire service water tanks connected to the FH/HR systems located at the roofs of the eight blocks.

8.11 China Status Development claimed that leakages were detected in the water tanks and that repair works were necessary. Pursuant to the FSIs Shutdown procedure stipulated in the FSD Circular Letter No. 1/2021, China Status Development submitted SDNs to the FSD giving notification of the shutdown of the FH/HR systems for all eight blocks of Wang Fuk Court by ticking the box for “FH/HR Systems”. In all these submitted SDNs, the box for FAS was left blank. Investigation after the fire revealed that at the material time, the FASs of all eight blocks except Wang Sun House had been shut down together with the FH/HR systems, yet, the shutdown of the FASs was not reflected in the aforementioned SDNs submitted.

[FSD/A(III)/1]

8.12 It is the owner’s responsibility to ensure that the FSIs are kept in

efficient working order. The RFSIC, as the competent person engaged by the owner, is responsible for inspecting the FSIs and reporting any identified deficiencies to FSD. In the case of Wang Fuk Court, the RFSIC clearly stated that only the FH/HR system was shut down for repair. Based on that information, FSD had no reason to believe that any other FSI – in particular the FAS – was affected, and could reasonably assume that the FAS remained in efficient working order. As no notification or other communication was ever given to FSD about any shutdown of the FAS, FSD was in fact unaware that the FAS had been taken out of operation. This lack of information is significant because FSD relies on timely and accurate reporting from the RFSIC and the owner to trigger the regulatory follow-up or risk assessment mentioned in para. 6.2 to para. 6.8 above. Without such notification, FSD had neither knowledge of nor opportunity to deal with the shutdown of the FAS until the matter later came to light.

- 8.13 To give an overall view regarding FSD’s response to the SDNs received, in accordance with the FSD’s established attendance protocol, an additional Major Pump (“MP”) as frontline fire appliance would be dispatched for any fire incident as a precautionary measure to ensure more fire service operational coverage during the shutdown period. As to the FSIs in question, the FSD undertook a series of follow up actions in accordance with established departmental procedures. The following paragraphs provide brief summaries in relation to the FSI shutdown in each block.

8.14 Wang Yan House (Block A)

[FSD/B/2]

8.14.1 Submission of Notification by China Status Development

On 4.9.2025, China Status Development submitted the SDNs to the FSCC [designated contact point of FSD for collection of such notice] by fax. The SDN, submitted by Ivan LEUNG, an authorized signatory of China Status Development, reported that shutdown of the sole FH/HR system serving Wang Yan House (Block A) was required from 5.9.2025 until the anticipated completion date of 18.9.2025. The shutdown was subsequently extended and FH/HR system remained to be out of operation on the date of the fire.

#### 8.14.2 Action taken by FSCC

Upon receipt of the SDN on 8.9.2025, FSCC notified the FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station, the responsible local fire station for Wang Fuk Court, on the same date. FSCC also updated the relevant details on the mobilizing system and arranged for the dispatch of one additional MP to any fire incident at Wang Yan House whilst the FH/HR system was shut down.

#### 8.14.3 Action taken by Tai Po Fire Station

Following the FSCC's notification on 8.9.2025, officer of Tai Po Fire Station took action in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as conducting on-site risk assessment, issuing advisory letter to remind the owner to maintain fire safety within the building while the system was non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works and to ensure its compliance.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4, pp. 7-9  
(A.S. No. 148/7-9)

#### 8.14.4 Extensions of Shutdown Period

8.14.4.1 On 17.9.2025, 3.10.2025, 16.10.2025, 30.10.2025 & 13.11.2025, China Status Development submitted

total 5 SDNs by fax to FSCC, in which the last extension valid until 27.11.2025. FSCC then updated mobilizing system accordingly, notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station on the same date.

8.14.4.2 RFSIC China Status Development issued an FS251 (No. A9688538) to report that there is water leakage from the FS Water Tank.

8.14.4.3 As the RFSIC had properly extended the shutdown on time (each extension sought within a 14-day period), the case was put under the monitoring of FPFS until the repair of the FSI concerned is completed.

#### 8.15 Wang Tao House (Block B)

[FSD/B/3]

##### 8.15.1 Submission of Notification by China Status Development

On 11.7.2025, China Status Development submitted the SDN to the FSCC by fax. The SDN, submitted by Ivan LEUNG of China Status Development, reported that shutdown of the sole FH/HR system serving Wang Tao House (Block B) was required from 11.7.2025 until the anticipated completion date of 24.7.2025. The shutdown was subsequently extended and the FH/HR system remained to be out of operation on the date of fire.

##### 8.15.2 Action taken by FSCC

Upon receipt of the SDN on 11.7.2025, FSCC notified the FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station on the same date. FSCC also updated the relevant details on the mobilizing system and arranged for the dispatch of one additional MP to any fire incident at Wang Tao House whilst the FH/HR system was shut down.

### 8.15.3 Action taken by Tai Po Fire Station

Following the FSCC's notification on 11.7.2025, officer of Tai Po Fire Station took action in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as conducting on-site risk assessment, issuing advisory letter to remind the owner to maintain fire safety within the building while the system was non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works and to ensure its compliance.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4, pp. 7-9  
(A.S. No. 148/7-9)

### 8.15.4 Extensions of Shutdown Period

8.15.4.1 On 24.7.2025, 7.8.2025, 21.8.2025, 4.9.2025, 17.9.2025, 3.10.2025, 16.10.2025, 30.10.2025 and 13.11.2025, China Status Development submitted total 9 SDNs by fax to FSCC, in which the last extension valid until 27.11.2025. FSCC then updated mobilizing system accordingly, notified the FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station.

8.15.4.2 RFSIC China Status Development issued an FS251 (No. A9556641) to report that there is water leakage from the FS Water Tank.

8.15.4.3 As the RFSIC had properly extended the shutdown on time, the case was put under the monitoring of FPFS until the repair of the FSI concerned is completed.

## 8.16 Wang Sun House (Block C)

[FSD/B/4]

### 8.16.1 Submission of Notification by China Status Development

On 4.7.2025, China Status Development submitted the SDN to the FSCC by fax. The SDN, submitted by Ivan LEUNG of China Status Development, reported that shutdown of the sole FH/HR system serving Wang Sun House (Block C) was required from 4.7.2025 until the anticipated completion date of 17.7.2025. The shutdown was subsequently extended and the FH/HR system remained to be out of operation on the date of fire.

#### 8.16.2 Action taken by FSCC

Upon receipt of the SDN on 4.7.2025, FSCC notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station on the same date. FSCC also updated the relevant details on the mobilizing system and arranged for the dispatch of one additional MP to any fire incident at Wang Sun House whilst the FH/HR system was shut down.

#### 8.16.3 Action taken by Tai Po Fire Station

Following the FSCC's notification on 4.7.2025, officer of Tai Po Fire Station took action in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as conducting on-site risk assessment, issuing advisory letter to remind the owner to maintain fire safety within the building while the system was non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works and to ensure its compliance.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4, pp. 7-9  
(A.S. No. 148/7-9)

#### 8.16.4 Extensions of Shutdown Period

8.16.4.1 On 16.7.2025, 30.7.2025, 14.8.2025, 27.8.2025, 11.9.2025, 22.9.2025, 9.10.2025, 24.10.2025, 6.11.2025 and 20.11.2025, China Status Development submitted total 10 SDNs by fax to FSCC, which the last extension valid until

4.12.2025. FSCC then updated mobilizing system accordingly, notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station.

8.16.4.2 RFSIC China Status Development issued an FS251 (No. A9556661) to report that there is water leakage from the FS Water Tank.

8.16.4.3 As the RFSIC had properly extended the shutdown on time, the case was put under the monitoring of FPFS until the repair of the FSI concerned is completed.

#### 8.17 Wang Kin House (Block D)

[FSD/B/5]

##### 8.17.1 Submission of Notification by China Status Development

On 16.5.2025, China Status Development submitted the SDN to the FSCC by fax. The SDN, submitted by Ivan LEUNG of China Status Development, reported that shutdown of the sole FH/HR system serving Wang Kin House (Block D) was required from 16.5.2025 until the anticipated completion date of 29.5.2025. The shutdown was subsequently extended and the FH/HR system remained to be out of operation on the date of fire.

##### 8.17.2 Action taken by FSCC

Upon receipt of the SDN on 16.5.2025, FSCC notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station on the same date. FSCC also updated the relevant details on the mobilizing system and arranged for the dispatch of one additional MP to any fire incident at Wang Kin House whilst the FH/HR system was shut down.

##### 8.17.3 Action by Tai Po Fire Station

Following the FSCC's notification on 16.5.2025, officer of Tai Po Fire Station took action in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as conducting on-site risk assessment, issuing advisory letter to remind the owner to maintain fire safety within the building while the system was non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works and to ensure its compliance.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4, pp. 7-9  
(A.S. No. 148/7-9)

#### 8.17.4 Extensions of Shutdown Period

8.17.4.1 On 29.5.2025, 12.6.2025, 26.6.2025, 10.7.2025, 24.7.2025, 7.8.2025, 21.8.2025, 4.9.2025, 17.9.2025, 3.10.2025, 16.10.2025, 30.10.2025 and 13.11.2025, China Status Development submitted total 13 SDNs by fax to FSCC, which the last extension valid until 27.11.2025. FSCC then updated mobilizing system accordingly, notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station.

8.17.4.2 RFSIC China Status Development issued an FS251 (No. A9556600) to report that there is water leakage from the FS Water Tank.

8.17.4.3 As the RFSIC had properly extended the shutdown on time, the case was put under monitoring by FPFS until the repair of the FSI concerned is completed.

### 8.18 Wang Tai House (Block E)

[FSD/B/6]

#### 8.18.1 Submission of Notification by China Status Development

On 7.4.2025, China Status Development submitted the SDN to the FSCC by fax. The SDN, submitted by Ivan LEUNG of China Status Development, reported that shutdown of the sole FH/HR system serving Wang Tai House was required from 7.4.2025 until the anticipated completion date of 20.4.2025. The shutdown was subsequently extended and the FH/HR system remained to be out of operation on the date of fire.

#### 8.18.2 Action taken by FSCC

Upon receipt of the SDN on 7.4.2025, FSCC notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station on the same date. FSCC also updated the relevant details on the mobilizing system and arranged for the dispatch of one additional MP to any fire incident at Wang Tai House whilst the FH/HR system was shut down.

#### 8.18.3 Action by Tai Po Fire Station

Following the FSCC's notification on 7.4.2025, officer of Tai Po Fire Station took action in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as conducting on-site risk assessment, issuing advisory letter to remind the owner to maintain fire safety within the building while the system was non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works and to ensure its compliance.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4, pp. 7-9  
(A.S. No. 148/7-9)

#### 8.18.4 Extensions of Shutdown Period

8.18.4.1 On 16.4.2025, 2.5.2025, 16.5.2025, 30.5.2025, 13.6.2025, 27.6.2025, 11.7.2025, 25.7.2025, 7.8.2025, 21.8.2025, 4.9.2025, 17.9.2025, 3.10.2025, 16.10.2025, 30.10.2025 and 13.11.2025, China Status Development

submitted total 16 SDNs by fax to FSCC, which the last extension valid until 27.11.2025. FSCC then updated mobilizing system accordingly, notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station.

8.18.4.2 RFSIC China Status Development issued an FS251 (No. A9556580) to report that there is water leakage from the FS Water Tank.

8.18.4.3 As the RFSIC had properly extended the shutdown on time, the case was put under the monitoring of FPFS until the repair of the FSI concerned is completed.

#### 8.19 Wang Cheong House (Block F)

[FSD/B/7]

##### 8.19.1 Submission of Notification by China Status Development

On 4.9.2025, China Status Development submitted the SDN to the FSCC by fax. The SDN, submitted by Ivan LEUNG of China Status Development, reported that shutdown of the sole FH/HR system serving Wang Cheong House was required from 5.9.2025 until the anticipated completion date of 18.9.2025. The shutdown was subsequently extended and the FH/HR system remained to be out of operation on the date of fire.

##### 8.19.2 Action taken by FSCC

Upon receipt of the SDN on 8.9.2025, member of FSCC notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station on the same date. FSCC also updated the relevant details on the mobilizing system and arranged for the dispatch of one additional MP to any fire incident at Wang Cheong House whilst the FH/HR system was shut down.

### 8.19.3 Action taken by Tai Po Fire Station

Following the FSCC's notification on 8.9.2025, officer of Tai Po Fire Station took action in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as conducting on-site risk assessment, issuing advisory letter to remind the owner to maintain fire safety within the building while the system was non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works and to ensure its compliance.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4, pp. 7-9  
(A.S. No. 148/7-9)

### 8.19.4 Extensions of Shutdown Period

8.19.4.1 On 17.9.2025, 3.10.2025, 16.10.2025, 30.10.2025 & 13.11.2025, China Status Development submitted total 5 SDNs by fax to FSCC, which the last extension valid until 27.11.2025. FSCC then updated mobilizing system accordingly, notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station.

8.19.4.2 RFSIC China Status Development issued an FS251 (No. A9688539) to report that there is water leakage from the FS Water Tank.

8.19.4.3 As the RFSIC had properly extended the shutdown on time, the case was put under the monitoring of FPFS until the repair of the FSI concerned is completed.

## 8.20 Wang Shing House (Block G)

[FSD/B/8]

### 8.20.1 Submission of Notification by China Status Development

On 16.6.2025, China Status Development submitted the SDN to

the FSCC by fax. The SDN, submitted by Ivan LEUNG of China Status Development, reported that shutdown of the sole FH/HR system serving Wang Shing House was required from 16.6.2025 until the anticipated completion date of 29.6.2025. The shutdown was subsequently extended and the FH/HR system remained to be out of operation on the date of fire.

#### 8.20.2 Action taken by FSCC

Upon receipt of the SDN on 16.6.2025, FSCC notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station on the same date. FSCC also updated the relevant details on the mobilizing system and arranged for the dispatch of one additional MP to any fire incident at Wang Shing House whilst the FH/HR system was shut down.

#### 8.20.3 Action taken by Tai Po Fire Station

Following the FSCC's notification on 16.6.2025, officer of Tai Po Fire Station took action in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as conducting on-site risk assessment, issuing advisory letter to remind the owner to maintain fire safety within the building while the system was non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works and to ensure its compliance.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
para. 4, pp. 7-9  
(A.S. No. 148/7-9)

#### 8.20.4 Extensions of Shutdown Period

8.20.4.1 On 27.6.2025, 11.7.2025, 25.7.2025, 7.8.2025, 21.8.2025, 4.9.2025, 17.9.2025, 3.10.2025, 16.10.2025, 30.10.2025 & 13.11.2025, China Status Development submitted total 11 SDNs by fax to FSCC, which the last extension valid until 27.11.2025. FSCC then updated mobilizing

system accordingly, notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station.

8.20.4.2 RFSIC China Status Development issued an FS251 (No. A9556620) to report that there is water leakage from the FS Water Tank.

8.20.4.3 As the RFSIC had properly extended the shutdown on time, the case was put under the monitoring of FPFS until the repair of the FSI concerned is completed.

## 8.21 Wang Chi House (Block H)

[FSD/B/9]

### 8.21.1 Submission of Notification by China Status Development

On 7.4.2025, China Status Development submitted the SDN to the FSCC by fax. The SDN, submitted by Ivan LEUNG of China Status Development, reported that shutdown of the sole FH/HR system serving Wang Chi House was required from 7.4.2025 until the anticipated completion date of 20.4.2025. The shutdown was subsequently extended and the FH/HR system remained to be out of operation on the date of fire.

### 8.21.2 Action taken by FSCC

Upon receipt of the SDN on 7.4.2025, FSCC notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station on the same date. FSCC also updated the relevant details on the mobilizing system and arranged for the dispatch of one additional MP to any fire incident at Wang Chi House whilst the FH/HR system was shut down.

### 8.21.3 Action taken by Tai Po Fire Station

Following the FSCC's notification on 7.4.2025, officer of Tai Po Fire Station took action in accordance with DPI/IV/4.2.16, such as conducting on-site risk assessment, issuing advisory letter to remind the owner to maintain fire safety within the building while the system was non-operable, emphasizing the importance of expediting the completion of repair works and to ensure its compliance. [FSD/G(I)/7] para. 4, pp. 7-9 (A.S. No. 148/7-9)

#### 8.21.4 Extensions of Shutdown Period

8.21.4.1 On 16.4.2025, 2.5.2025, 16.5.2025, 30.5.2025, 13.6.2025, 27.6.2025, 11.7.2025, 25.7.2025, 7.8.2025, 21.8.2025, 4.9.2025, 17.9.2025, 3.10.2025, 16.10.2025, 30.10.2025 & 13.11.2025, China Status Development submitted total 16 SDNs by fax to FSCC, which the last extension valid until 27.11.2025. FSCC then updated mobilizing system accordingly, notified FPFS and Tai Po Fire Station.

8.21.4.2 RFSIC China Status Development issued an FS251 (No. A9556591) to report that there is water leakage from the FS Water Tank.

8.21.4.3 As the RFSIC had properly extended the shutdown on time, the case was put under the monitoring of FPFS until the repair of the FSI concerned is completed.

**Part E - Inspection and test reports which reflect the status of the building materials and FSI in Wang Fuk Court that were tested and/or inspected by FSD and the RFSIC (if any) since July 2024, and our findings thereof, and whether any subsequent follow-up and enforcement actions were taken**

9. Reports of Annual Inspections by RFSIC and Follow-ups by FSD

9.1 The following paragraphs will only address the part of **Question 14.4.2** concerning the inspection and test reports for the FSI in Wang Fuk Court as those reports for the building materials in Wang Fuk Court are not in FSD's possession. In accordance with Regulation 8 of Cap. 95B, the owner of any FSIs (including the Owners' Corporation) shall keep such installation or equipment in efficient working order at all times, and shall arrange for inspection of such FSIs by an RFSIC at least once every 12 months. The RFSIC named Victory was appointed by the PMC "ISS EastPoint Properties Limited" ("ISS") to conduct annual inspections of the emergency lighting ("EL"), FH/HR system, FAS and fire extinguishers for all eight blocks of Wang Fuk Court on 24.3.2025.

[FSD/A(I)/3]

9.2 According to the FS251s dated 31.3.2025, all the FSIs provided in Wang Fuk Court were in compliant with FSD requirements, certifying that all FSIs, including the FAS, should be operable. Although the systems were generally satisfactory in condition, the FS251 denoted that several minor defects [e.g. manual call points (components of the FAS) defects at some location, etc.] were identified that required follow-up or repair action.

[FSD/B/2-9]  
Part IIs

9.3 According to information from Police, Victory was subsequently awarded the contract in October 2025 to remedy the defects

[FSD/C(I)/1-3]

identified during the annual inspection in March 2025 as mentioned in the aforementioned FS251s, and the rectification works were undertaken from 19 to 26.11.2025. Although Victory has rectified all the defects identified during the annual inspection, Victory still has not issued any FS251 in respect of the repair works as required by Regulation 9(1) of Cap. 95B because the final functional test is still outstanding as the relevant FH/HR system remained out of operation owing to concurrent repair works on the fire service water tanks undertaken by another RFSIC, China Status Development.

**Part F - All test reports on building materials and FSI in Wang Fuk Court that were tested *after the fire* (which relate to the causes and rapid spread of the fire and challenges in the Operation and Evacuation)**

10. Information on Test on FSIs during Post-fire Investigations

[FSD/D(III)/4]

10.1 The following paragraphs will only address the part of **Question 14.4.4** concerning the post-fire test reports on the FSI in Wang Fuk Court as those reports on the building materials in Wang Fuk Court are not in FSD's possession. The FH/HR systems in all eight blocks of Wang Fuk Court, notified as shut down for repair in the SDN submitted by China Status Development, were inoperative. In light of this, the focus of the post-fire investigations carried out by members of FPFS was to assess mainly the functionality of the FAS across the eight blocks of Wang Fuk Court, for which no notification of shutdown had been received and hence the system should have been in efficient working order during the outbreak of fire. These investigations primarily focused on the condition and functionality of the FAS.

- 10.2 Two key abnormal situations were found during post-fire investigation. Firstly, some of the FS pump rooms that are located on the ground floor of each block were found unlocked during post-fire inspection. There is no indication of our fire crew members having to effect forcible entry into those unlocked FS pump rooms during the fire. Therefore, it is believed that those FS pump rooms were kept unlocked before outbreak of fire. Secondly, the entry logbooks of those FS pump rooms were checked and were found empty. It is believed that the security level of those FS pump rooms was weak.
- 10.3 Another abnormal situation found during post-fire investigation is that inside the FS pump rooms for seven of the eight blocks, the main power switch located next to the control panel was found in the “OFF” position. For background information, the main power switch located next to the control panel has a single “ON” and “OFF” position which simultaneously controls the power supply to both the FH/HR system and the FAS. Switching the main power switch to the “OFF” position had the direct effect of deactivating both the FH/HR system and FAS during the fire. It is noteworthy that the control panel is equipped with two pump isolator switches, which are able to interrupt the power supply to the two pumps of the FH/HR system even when the main power switch remains in the “ON” position. Accordingly, it is possible to shut down solely the FH/HR system by simply switching off the pump isolators, rather than by switching off the main power switch, which would otherwise cut the power supply to both the FH/HR system and the FAS.
- 10.4 Wang Yan House (Block A)

Post-fire investigation at Wang Yan House (Block A) was firstly

conducted by StnO SHEK Ngai-chun on 26.11.2025. During the inspection, the FS pump room was found unlocked and the main power switch was found at the “OFF” position. The FAS was preliminarily tested but failed to work.

#### 10.5 Wang Tao House (Block B)

Post-fire investigation at Wang Tao House (Block B) was firstly conducted by StnO SHEK Ngai-chun on 26.11.2025. During the inspection, the FS pump room was found unlocked and the main power switch was found at the “OFF” position. The FAS was preliminarily tested but failed to work.

#### 10.6 Wang Sun House (Block C)

Post-fire investigation at Wang Sun House (Block C) was firstly conducted by StnO SHEK Ngai-chun on 27.11.2025. During the inspection, the FS pump room was found unlocked and the main power switch was found at the “ON” position. However, the FAS was preliminarily tested but still failed to work even though the fire alarm was reported by first attending fire crews to have momentarily actuated at the incipient phase of the fire.

#### 10.7 Wang Kin House (Block D)

Post-fire investigation at Wang Kin House (Block D) was firstly conducted by SStnO CHAN Kin-lok on 27.11.2025. During the inspection, the FS pump room was found locked and required a key to unlock and the main power switch was found at the “OFF” position. The FAS was preliminarily tested but failed to work.

#### 10.8 Wang Tai House (Block E)

Post-fire investigation at Wang Tai House (Block E) was firstly conducted by SStnO CHAN Kin-lok on 27.11.2025. During the

inspection, the FS pump room was found locked and required forcible entry during the investigation and the main power switch was found at the “OFF” position. Due to waterlogging in the fire pump room and potential risk of electrical leakage, the FAS could not be tested.

#### 10.9 Wang Cheong House (Block F)

Post-fire investigation at Wang Cheong House (Block F) was firstly conducted by SFn [REDACTED] WONG Kin-chi on 27.11.2025. During the inspection, the FS pump room was found unlocked and the main power switch was found at the “OFF” position. Due to waterlogging in the fire pump room and potential risk of electrical leakage, the FAS could not be tested.

#### 10.10 Wang Shing House (Block G)

Post-fire investigation at Wang Shing House (Block G) was firstly conducted by SFn [REDACTED] WONG Kin-chi on 27.11.2025. During the inspection, the FS pump room was found locked and required forcible entry during the investigation and the main power switch was found at the “OFF” position. The FAS was preliminarily tested but failed to work.

#### 10.11 Wang Chi House (Block H)

Post-fire investigation at Wang Chi House (Block H) was firstly conducted by StnO SHEK Ngai-chun on 26.11.2025. During the inspection, the FS pump room was found unlocked and the main power switch was found at the “OFF” position. The FAS was preliminarily tested but failed to work. Given that Wang Chi House was only minimally affected by the fire, it is expected that the FAS should remain intact and undamaged, and therefore should be operable. However, testing revealed that the FAS was

not functional, even with the main power switch turned on. In light of this finding, FSD will conduct a thorough investigation into the status of the system to determine the underlying issues.

- 10.12 As explained above, concerning observations were made regarding the FASs in these blocks. The main power switches for all eight blocks, excluding Wang Sun House, were found in the “OFF” position. Given that no prior SDN related to the FAS at Wang Fuk Court had been submitted to the FSD before the fire outbreak, for the reasons stated in para. 8.12 above, it was expected that the system should have been remained fully operable.
- 10.13 These circumstances give rise to serious concerns, especially since the doors to five of the eight FS pump rooms were found unlocked, permitting unrestricted access. The identity of the person who disabled these switches and the timing thereof remain undetermined. In view of the suspicious nature of these findings, the matter has been referred to the Police for further investigation.
- 10.14 According to information from Police, an electrical technician [FSD/C(I)/4-5] employed by the PMC of Wang Fuk Court, ISS, claimed to have switched off the main power for the FH/HR system of the said buildings between April and August 2025. He claimed to have done so on the request of “Prestige Construction & Engineering Co. Limited”, the main contractor of the building works of Wang Fuk Court (under the Operation Building Bright scheme) which instructed China Status Development to conduct repair works on the fire service tanks.

**Part G - Recommendations to enable timely warnings to be given to residents in cases of fire alarm failure**

- 11.1 If the RFSIC had duly notified the FSD of the shutdown of the FAS using the prescribed notification form, i.e. SDN through FSCC, such information would have been transmitted to the responding fire appliances, ensuring that the officer-in-charge was fully informed of the situation prior to arrival. [FSD/G(I)/7] Appendix IV, p. 17 (A.S. No. 148/17)
- 11.2 Pursuant to the provisions set out in FSD Circular Letter No. 1/2021, the RFSIC bears the responsibility of informing both residents and the property management company of the details of FAS shutdown, particularly where the system is expected to remain non-operable overnight or for longer than 24 hours. Had this information been properly disseminated and appropriately displayed by notice at a prominent location on G/F of each building indicating both the system status and the anticipated duration of shutdown, residents would have been more alert to potential fire risks. This greater level of awareness would likely have facilitated earlier mutual alerts and more rapid evacuation during an emergency without wasting precious evacuation time trying to switch on the fire alarm. [FSD/A(III)/1]
- 11.3 Furthermore, with proper notification of the status of the FAS, the PMC could have followed up/monitored the progress of maintenance by RFSIC in accordance with the Code of Conduct - Handling Fire Safety Work issued by the Property Management Services Authority and implemented additional fire safety measures as required by FSD during the shutdown period. Such a monitoring response should have included diligent supervision of the fire alarm repair process, prompt coordination with the RFSIC to expedite system restoration, and actions ensuring that residents were kept [FSD/G(III)/5] para. A(4)(e), p. 9

informed and that fire crews were duly informed of the fire alarm situation by the management staff at the time of the fire outbreak.

11.4 Finally, in situations involving the failure of a FAS, it is recommended that property owners, management bodies, and the RFSIC take proactive steps to, promptly and adequately, notify building occupants of the shutdown of those major FSI, including the FAS. Such notification should include posting detailed information about the shutdown at the entrances, inside the main lobby, outside the F.S. control room and at prominent locations on each affected floors of the building, clearly labeling each non-operable component, and distributing notices to each occupant's mailbox to ensure that all residents are adequately informed. In the long term, the FSD will explore more reliable, practical, and technology-based temporary measures to give alert to occupants in the event of a fire when the alarm system is temporarily out of service.

**Part H - Reporting procedures and obligations on contractors to inform FSD of the suspensions of the fire hydrant, hose reel, and fire alarm systems during the renovation of Wang Fuk Court**

12. Required Procedures of Temporary Suspension or Shutdown of FSI taken by RFSIC

12.1 General Procedures for Handling FSI Shutdown

Pursuant to FSD Circular Letter No. 1/2021 – Shutdown of Fire Service Installations for Maintenance, Inspection, Modification or Repair and the Departmental Policy Instructions (DPI/IV/4.2.16 - General Procedures for Handling Defective FSI and FSI Shutdown Cases), the shutdown mechanism for FSIs is a stringently [FSD/A(III)/1] [FSD/G(I)/7]

regulated protocol designed to uphold fire safety during maintenance or repair works of FSIs. When a RFSIC is engaged to maintain/modify/repair major defect(s) of major FSI and the works is expected to be carried out overnight or for more than 24 hours continuously, the RFSIC shall notify the FSD of the defect(s) forthwith, and in any event within 24 hours after the defect(s) are formally identified.

12.2 The relevant major FSIs include:

- (a) FH/HR System
- (b) Sprinkler System
- (c) Fire Alarm System
- (d) Street Fire Hydrant System
- (e) Water Spray System
- (f) Smoke Extraction System
- (g) Staircase Pressurization System
- (h) Dry Riser System
- (i) Fire Detection System of premises with sleeping risk

12.3 The subject RFSIC is required to submit the SDN to the FSCC forthwith, but no later than 24 hours after the defect is identified. Simultaneously, the contractor must display standardized notices detailing the shutdown at prominent locations within the building to alert residents and occupants.

12.4 Should an extension of the shutdown period be required, the RFSIC shall, before the previously scheduled date of completion, submit a SDN (Part II Extension of FSI Shutdown). The period of FSI shutdown in each submission shall not exceed 14 days. However, if there are variations in the extent of the affected FSI system(s) which warrant shutdown for maintenance/inspection/

modification/repair, the RFSIC shall submit a fresh written notification to the FSD following the procedures delineated above.

- 12.5 Upon completion of the works, the RFSIC shall submit a SDN (Part III Resumption of FSI) in writing to FSCC. The serial number of the relevant FS251 which was issued previously for such work shall also be indicated in the SDN. FSCC will then send a copy of the form to FPFS and the local fire station via email, and expunge the relevant FSI shutdown record from the mobilizing system.
- 12.6 Upon receipt of the SDN, the FSCC would notify the FPFS and the local fire station by email. Furthermore, FSCC shall update the mobilizing system and dispatch one additional MP to the fire incident at the specified address.
- 12.7 Following the initial SDN, the concerned fire station shall visit the premises within 24 hours to conduct an on-site risk assessment. If the situation does not warrant the provision of standby means, the fire station concerned shall issue an advisory letter to the owner(s) of FSI to urge them to rectify the defects and advise them of their duties and responsibilities in particular during the shutdown period. Periodic liaisons for monitoring the progress of the FSI maintenance/modification/repair work from an operational perspective will be carried out by the fire station concerned until the case has been handled by FPFS.
- 12.8 If the extent of FSI shutdown warrants the provision of standby means, the fire station concerned shall issue an advisory letter to the owner(s) of FSIs requiring the provision of suggested standby means until the resumption of the affected FSIs. Re-inspection shall be carried out 72 hours after the issue of the advisory letter.

If standby means have not been provided, the fire station concerned shall issue a warning letter to the owner(s) of FSI informing them that failing to provide such standby means within 72 hours may constitute a fire hazard and FHAN may then be issued. If standby means have still not been provided upon expiry of the warning letter, the fire station concerned shall issue FHAN to the owner(s) of FSIs requiring them to take such measures within a specified time. Time limits for provision of standby means for one unit and for more than one unit are 10 and 30 calendar days respectively.

12.9 Following the notification of the shutdown, FPFS closely monitors situation of each case. Upon receipt of a SDN, FPFS tracks each notification through cases created by local fire stations. Cases that are properly extended are subject to vigilant monitoring, while those lacking proper extensions are systematically reviewed for follow-up actions on a regular basis. The follow-up action includes (i) contacting the responsible RFSIC to obtain updates on repair progress and to remind them to submit requisite documentation for extending the shutdown, if necessary; and (ii) in instances where the responsible RFSIC cannot be identified for outstanding cases, FPFS will take further steps to engage with the building owner or arrange for an on-site inspection if the circumstances warrant.


12.10 If any irregularity is discovered during follow-up actions, the FPFS will initiate appropriate enforcement measures against the owner of FSI to expedite the restoration of the system's functionality. To facilitate FSD officers in determining the appropriate scale and type of standby means required during the suspension of FSI, a set of non-exhaustive guidelines is established

in Appendix V of the Departmental Policy Instructions, serving as a reference for officers conducting on-site risk assessments and providing standby means to mitigate fire risk when FSIs are suspended. These guidelines take into consideration various factors, such as the type of building, the nature of the occupants (e.g., elderly homes), the specific FSI shutdown, and the building's configuration.

[FSD/G(I)/7]  
Appendix V,  
pp.18-20  
(A.S. No.  
148/18-20)

- 12.11 With respect to the temporary suspension of the FH/HR system, as reported by China Status Development to the FSD commencing in April 2025, reference should be made to Section 14.4.3 of the FSI Shutdown Status of Wang Fuk Court for detailed information.
- 12.12 The above sets out the general reporting procedures and obligations for the handling of FSI shutdown. As for the handling of FSI shutdown at Wang Fuk Court in reply to the remaining part of **Question 19.5**, please refer to para. 8.9 to para. 8.21 above for the extent of the notification of FSI shutdown received by FSD and the follow-up actions taken by FSD.
13. I confirm that the contents of this Witness Statement are true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief.

Dated this 16<sup>th</sup> day of January 2026.



KEUNG Sai-ming  
Assistant Director (Licensing & Certification)  
Fire Services Department